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virtue.' Discussions of ethics in negotiation sometimes draw on such
Platonic ideals to encourage parties to choose the long-term benefits of
2
virtuous behavior over the short-term benefits of material gain. But this
notion of moderation leaves out an entire swath of society: people with no
wealth. Where are they expected to fall on the virtue scale when negotiating
for some material advantage? To the extent that ethical negotiation is treated
as a universal good, the very poor are indistinguishable from the very
wealthy, and all are held to the same standard. 3
From a moral perspective, this is arguably the correct approach.
However, the question is much more difficult from a practical perspective.
In particular, once we attempt to police ethical conduct, we risk imposing
unfair burdens due to improperly calibrated rules of conduct.4 If the Rules of
Professional Conduct governing lawyers are improperly calibrated, we may
create a dynamic in which those with the lowest wealth are held to the
highest standards of virtue, which in turn leads to unethical outcomes.
This Article focuses on whether Model Rule 4.1, which prohibits an
attorney from making false statements of material fact, is properly calibrated

1.

Gerald Wetlaufer, The Limits of Integrative Bargaining, in WHAT'S FAIR: ETHICS

FOR NEGOTIATORS 48 (Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Michael Wheeler eds., 2004) [hereinafter
WHAT'S FAIR] (citing PLATO, GORGIAS 37-50, 66, 72, 85, 90 (Donald J. Zeyl trans., 1987));

see generally Carol D. Ryff, HappinessIs Everything, or Is It? Explorations on the Meaning of
Psychological Well-Being, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1069, 1070 (1989) (stating
that "happiness" is a loose translation of eudaimonia, a Greek concept that translates more
precisely as "well-being").
2.
See, e.g., Wetlaufer, supra note 1, at 48 ("[A] negotiator's pecuniary self-interest is,
at best, only a portion of his true self-interest."); Jonathan R. Cohen, When People Are the
Means: Negotiating With Respect, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 767 (2001) (discussing the
personal benefits of grappling with one's morality); see also Rob Atkinson, An Elevation of
Neo-ClassicalProfessionalism in Law and Business, 12 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 621, 662
(2014) (drawing heavily on Platonic discourse to broadly reframe concepts of
professionalism); James Boyd White, The Ethics of Argument: Plato's Gorgias and the
Modern Lawyers, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 849, 850 (1983) (arguing that the Socratic dialogues in
Gorgias are the best way to enliven the "dreary" discourse surrounding legal ethics).
3.
But see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016) ("[A]ll
lawyers should devote professional time and resources and use civic influence to ensure equal
access to our system of justice for all those who because of economic or social barriers cannot
afford or secure adequate legal counsel.").
4.
See generally Irma S. Russell, The Evolving Regulation of the Legal Profession:
The Costs of Indeterminacy and Certainty, 2008 J. PROF. L. SYMP. ISSUES 137, 138 (2008)
(describing ethical rules as a normative system designed to influence behavior, with sanctions
that consider the gravity of the interests at stake).
5.
See Philip Schrag, The Unethical Ethics Rule: Nine Ways to Fix Model Rule of
ProfessionalConduct 1.8(e), 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 39, 44-45 (2015) (asserting that Model
Rule 1.8(e), which prohibits lawyers from providing financial assistance to clients, acts to deny
adequate access to the justice system for indigent clients).
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when applied to the negotiation context. Drawing on the work of a variety of
ethicists both inside and outside the legal profession, this Article will
evaluate how to draw an ethical line between a false statement of material
fact that violates Model Rule 4.1 and a strategy that helps ensure a fair
outcome for a low-income client in furtherance of the lawyer's duty to the
client.6
The difficulty in drawing the right line is perhaps starkest in the
negotiation context. Indeed, the degree of candor a lawyer should bring to a
negotiation is one of the most vexing questions in both theory and practice.
Moreover, the division between the theorists and the ethicists is also stark:
theorists tend to evaluate the question of the appropriate level of candor
without regard to professional rules of conduct to the great dismay of
ethicists who in fact believe that the professional rules should be stricter.8
The difficulty in line-drawing is further heightened in situations
involving significant disparities in bargaining power, where the rules
governing negotiation ethics may in fact worsen the power differential. 9
Surprisingly little attention has been paid to how these power differentials
play out in settings involving low-income litigants.' 0 This Article seeks to
begin bridging this gap by arguing that sanctions-based rules requiring
candor in negotiation may create barriers to settlement to the particular
disadvantage of low-income litigants.

6.
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 ("A lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client."); id. r. 1.3 ("A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence
and promptness in representing a client.").
7.
See, e.g., Ausherman v. Bank of Am. Corp., 212 F. Supp. 2d 435, 446 (D. Md.
2002) (explaining that the line dividing ethical behavior from unethical behavior can be
"difficult to discern" in the negotiation context); Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory ofLegal
Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789, 1816 (2000) (stating that "how much candor to exhibit . . is
one of the most difficult normative questions with which negotiators wrestle").
8.
See, e.g., Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie of Lawyers'Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L.
REv. 577, 578-79 (1975) (arguing that lawyers should be expected to observe "something
more than the morality of the market place"); Gerald Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in
Negotiations, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1219, 1272 (1990) (positing that lawyers must grant a place for
a broader form of ethics outside the Model Rules in the practice of law).
9.
See, e.g., Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargainingand the ProcessofEthics, in WHAT'S
FAIR, supra note 1, at 270 ("Negotiation . . raises controversial questions of whether power or
status . . may impinge upon outcomes. When the unique ethical questions that surround
negotiation are added, these power and status disparities may be exacerbated.") (footnote
omitted).
10. See Michael Meltsner & Philip Schrag, Negotiating Tactics for Legal Services
Lawyers, in WHAT'S FAIR, supra note 1, at 205 (explaining that when it comes to legal
services and public interest lawyers, "relatively little has been written on the tactics and
techniques of negotiation").
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This Article presents two critiques of the conventional interpretation of
Model Rule 4.1. First, by requiring truthfulness about a client's bottom line
for settlement, Rule 4.1 disproportionately disadvantages low-income
clients. Second, to the extent that Rule 4.1 does not draw a clear line
between permissible and impermissible tactics, the rule may chill settlement
discussions in circumstances in which both parties would benefit from less
restrained negotiation.
Regarding the first critique, low-income clients are more likely to have a
lower threshold for acceptable settlements." Indeed, ethics rules already
disadvantage low-income clients by prohibiting lawyers from financing
living expenses for clients who need funds to cover their daily needs such as
food and rent.12 As a result, clients who are facing severe financial pressures
may be more likely to accept a lower settlement amount 3 than clients who
do not need a quick settlement in order to pay basic living expenses and can
therefore afford to prolong negotiations.1 4 To the extent that low-income
clients are likely to perceive lowball offers as acceptable, the requirement
that a lawyer must be truthful when discussing a client's authorization to
settle disproportionately disadvantages this type of client.
The second critique highlights the fact that such a rule does not always
benefit ordinary litigants, either. Indeed, strong prohibitions against false
statements in negotiation may have the unintended consequence of chilling
settlement discussions in circumstances in which both parties would benefit
from unfettered discussion. Thus, a sanctions-based regime requiring candor

11. See, e.g., Courtney R. Barksdale, All That Glitters Isn't Gold: Analyzing the Costs
and Benefits of Litigation Finance, 26 REV. LITIG. 707, 710 (2007) (stating that even where
lenders assist low-income individuals in financing the costs of their claim, such agreements
provide that the lender is entitled to a substantial portion of the settlement or award).
12. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.8(e). See MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ ET
AL., PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETHICS 163 (11th ed. 2015) (stating that this prohibition has been
heavily criticized and quite controversial from its introduction).
13. Or, even more problematically, such clients may turn to a litigation financing lender
who will purchase the client's claim in exchange for an even lower cash payment. This is a
lose-lose proposition, because the defendant must now negotiate against a corporate entity
with more freedom to gamble on upside. See, e.g., Barksdale, supra note 11, at 710 ("[F]irms
are willing to provide loans where traditional lenders are not because they stand to gain a
substantial percentage of the plaintiffs recovery or an attorney's contingent fee when the case
is settled or is won at trial.").
14. Waiting out a defendant's posturing is itself a powerful negotiation technique. See
generally Edward T. Hall & William Foote Whyte, InterculturalCommunication: A Guide to
Men ofAction, 19 HUMAN ORG. 4-5 (1960) (providing that the head of a large Japanese firm
believed that he could get Americans, due to their impatience, to agree to almost anything
simply by making them wait).
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in negotiations may have the unexpected effect of making negotiations more
difficult rather than less difficult.
Section I introduces Model Rule 4.1 and explains how it applies to
negotiations. Section II critiques the requirement of candor in negotiations,
explaining how strict rules can chill settlement discussions and cause
particular harm to low-income litigants. Section III offers some suggestions
for a new approach to Rule 4.1 that avoids these particular problems.
II. MODEL RULE 4.1 AND ITS APPLICATION TO NEGOTIATIONS

This section explains the lawyer's duty of truthfulness and outlines the
conventional wisdom about how to determine whether a negotiation tactic
crosses an ethical line in violation of this duty. Part A introduces Model
Rule 4.1, the rule requiring lawyers to be truthful in their dealings with
others. Part B outlines the negotiation process and identifies a particularly
thorny issue of settlement authorization or reservation price. Part C explains
why the question of settlement authorization is particularly sensitive for lowincome litigants. Lastly, Part D discusses the conventional wisdom regarding
the application of Rule 4.1 to the question of settlement authorization.
A.

The Lawyer's Duty of Truthfulness

When we think of lawyers, we tend to divide the world into two main
camps: the litigators and the counselors. The litigators are the courtroom
performers who present cases to a judge or a jury, as well as the lawyers
who engage in the many precursors to getting into the courtroom in the first
instance-the research, the pleading and motion writing, and the discovery
practice. In contrast, few counselors expect to see the inside of a
courtroom instead, they advise business and government agencies about
transactions and regulatory issues. But regardless of how close to a
courtroom a lawyer comes in his chosen field, one skill that crosses this
divide between litigation and transactional or regulatory work is
negotiation. 15

15. See generally James White, Machiavelli and the Bar, in WHAT'S FAIR, supra note
1, at 92 (stating that negotiation ethics apply to "an almost galactic scope of disputes"); Robert
H. Mnookin, When Not to Negotiate: A Negotiation Imperialist Reflects on Appropriate
Limits, 74 U. COLO. L. REv. 1077, 1077 (2003) (stating that "negotiations are omnipresent"
not just in practice but in day-to-day life); Douglas R. Richmond, Lawyers' Professional

Responsibilities and Liabilities in Negotiations, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 249, 249 (2009)
("[A]lmost all lawyers negotiate.").
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All lawyers are governed by ethical rules,16 some that apply specifically
to the particular task the lawyer is performing and others that apply more
broadly to a range of tasks.' 7 When performing a specific task, a lawyer
needs to be mindful of all of the general and specific rules that govern that
particular task. In the negotiation context, this is truly daunting, as the ABA
has identified almost thirty different ethical considerations that apply in the
negotiation context.1 Many of the rules that apply to negotiations are
straightforward. For example, a lawyer cannot settle a case without the
client's authorization.19 But others are more complicated to apply.20 And one
of the most complicated rules impacting negotiations is Model Rule 4.1,
21
which prohibits an attorney from making false statements of material fact.
Model Rule 4.1 is not limited to any specific practice area or setting, but
22
rather applies to the full range of lawyers in all of their representations.
Yet, this is also a controversial rule for three reasons. First, it not only
requires an attorney to be honest in the things he says, but it also requires an

&

16. Lawyers are regulated at the state level, and each state has its own ethical rules. See,
e.g., S.C. App. CT. R. r. 407 RPC 8.4(d). However, most states draw from the American Bar
Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct. For simplicity purposes, this Article will
focus on the latter.
17. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (requiring a litigator to
disclose adverse authority to the tribunal), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1. 1
1.3 (requiring an attorney to act with competence and diligence in pursuing a client's
interests).
18. See generally ABA, Ethical Guidelines for Settlement Negotiations (2002). The
guidelines suggest thirty-four different considerations that draw on a variety of different Model
Rules; however, a few of these rules only apply in specific factual contexts, such as
representing multiple clients (Model Rule 1.8(g), or representing particular types of clients,
such as a client with diminished capacity (Model Rule 1.14)).
19. Id. at 13-14 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a)).
20. See id. at 15-17 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.5 cmt. 5)
(explaining that lawyers who seek to limit their clients' settlement options in a retainer
agreement must be "scrupulously accurate and complete . . . to avoid the risk of misleading or
manipulating the[ir] client"); see also Andrew Hogan, The Naive Negotiator:An Empirical
Study of First-Year Law Students' Truth-Telling Ethics, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 725, 726
(2013) (explaining that under the Model Rules, "the line between what is legal and what is not
can sometimes be hard to find").
21. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4.1. See Richmond, supra note 15, at 268
("[T]he thorniest professional responsibility issues to arise in negotiations are rooted in the soil
of honesty.").
22. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4.1. See generally id. r. 3.3(a) (extending the
truthfulness requirement to apply within the litigation context by requiring candor to a
tribunal); id. r. 8.4(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from being dishonest in his dealings with others,
including non-professional settings).
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attorney to correct mistakes in some instances. 23 Second, in some situations,
it conflicts with an attorney's duty to keep client information confidential
24
unless the client has authorized disclosure. Third, the duty is narrower in
the negotiation context, where the question of what is a false statement of
material fact is governed by "generally accepted conventions in
negotiation." 25
Much ink has been spilled attempting to delineate which negotiation
26
tactics are consistent with Rule 4.1 and which tactics are unethical. The
lack of any clear consensus raises the question of whether, in fact, there are
27
any generally accepted conventions of negotiation. Perhaps in lieu of any
commonly shared understanding of what is generally accepted in
negotiation, Comment 2 to Model Rule 4.1 attempts to outline some
acceptable practices: "puffery," such as self-serving estimates of valuation
or damages, does not violate Rule 4.1, nor do general statements about a
client's intentions as to an acceptable settlement; in contrast, false statements
of material fact are prohibited, even in negotiation.28
While it is often easy to tell the difference between a false statement of
material fact and puffery, the line is not always clear.29 As Part C explains

23. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4.1 cmt. 1 ("Misrepresentations can also
occur by partially true but misleading statements or omissions that are the equivalent of
affirmative false statements.").
24. See, e.g., ABA, supra note 18, at 38 ("[T]he ethical duty of confidentiality under
Model Rule 1.6 . . trumps the ethical duty of disclosure under Model Rule 4.1(b)."); see also
Richmond, supra note 15, at 262 (explaining that other ethical rules may strain a lawyer's
confidentiality obligations).
25. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4.1 cmt. 2.
26. See, e.g., Art Hinshaw et al., Attorneys and Negotiation Ethics: A Material
Misunderstanding?,29 NEGOT. J. 265, 282 (2013) ("[I]n many instances deceit, misdirection,
and lying are 'ethical' negotiation tactics under the rules of professional conduct."); Reed
Elizabeth Loder, Moral Truthseeking and the Virtuous Negotiator, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
45, 73 (1994) (discussing a lawyer's use of deception when discussing a settlement amount);
Barry R. Tempkin, Misrepresentation by Omission in Settlement Negotiations: Should There
Be a Silent Safe Harbor?, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 179, 180 (2004) ("The ethical constraints
on a lawyer's misleading statements and omissions during settlement negotiations have been
largely defined on a patchwork and intuitive level."); White, supra note 15, at 91-92
(discussing the requirement of truthfulness in negotiations).
27. See, e.g., Walter W. Steele, Jr., Deceptive Negotiating and High-TonedMorality, 39
VAND. L. REv. 1287, 1403 (1986) ("[N]o well-understood, commonly accepted unifying
philosophy for negotiating exists.").
28. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4.1 cmt. 2 (excluding from the category
of material facts "generally accepted conventions in negotiation").
29. See Hogan, supra note 20, at 729 ("Determining what is and is not a material fact is
a dizzying task."); see also James B. Boskey, Blueprint for Negotiations, 48-DEC DISP.
RESOL. J. 8, 17 (1993) (evaluating the propriety of lies and misrepresentations is "[o]ne of the
most difficult questions in legal ethics"). But see DONALD G. GIFFORD, LEGAL NEGOTIATION:
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below, the line is particularly hazy when it comes to questions about
Before addressing this
settlement authorization or reservation price.
ambiguity, Part B will explain these concepts.
B.

Settlement Authorization and Reservation Price

Typically, the first step in settlement discussions is for each party to
calculate its reservation point-i.e., the minimum price the plaintiff will
accept or the maximum price the defendant will pay in order to avoid a
trial. 30 The difference between the two reservation points is known as the
bargaining zone, and settlement is only possible if the defendant's
reservation point is higher than the plaintiff's. 3
For both parties, the reservation point is based on a calculation of their
Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA). 32 In litigation, a
BATNA is calculated by considering the expected amount of recovery,
discounted for the likelihood of winning at trial, and subtracting any legal
costs incurred in taking the case to trial.33 The reservation point for each
party is the point at which they will decide that a trial is better than a
negotiated settlement. In other words, if the defendant's final offer is below
the plaintiff's reservation point, the plaintiff would rather go to trial than
accept the offer. 34

Parties use a number of sources to calculate their respective reservation
points, including factual information specific to the case, applicable laws
and case law, and data about jury awards in similar cases.35 However, the
reservation point is also influenced by a variety of biases that lead each party
36
to interpret the public information in the way that most favors their case.
Finally, reservation points are also influenced by private information known

THEORY AND PRACTICE 113 & n.20 (2d ed. 2007) (citing ROGER HAYDOCK, NEGOTIATION
PRACTICE 201-02 (1984)) (questioning whether the difficulty in properly applying Rule 4.1

fully accounts for the frequent use of misrepresentation of facts in negotiation).
30. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 7, at 1792 (providing that "the maximum amount
that a buyer will pay for a good, service, or other legal entitlement is called his 'reservation
point' . . . . [and] [t]he minimum amount that a seller would accept for that item is her
[reservation point]").
31. Id. at 1793.
32. Id. at 1795 (citing ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES 100 (2d ed. 1991)).
33. Id. at 1795-96. See Boskey, supra note 29, at 8, 11 (discussing how parties evaluate
their BATNA in the transactional context).
34. Korobkin, supra note 7, at 1796.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1798 (citing George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness
and PretrialBargaining,22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 150 (1993)).
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only to the party, such as that party's degree of risk tolerance or the specific
litigation costs that a party will incur.37
Assuming that each party has a reservation point that creates some
possibility of settlement, the next step is to find a mutually acceptable
settlement point within the bargaining zone.38 Each side will seek a
settlement point that allows their client to capture a meaningful portion of
the surplus.

39

As a result, this is the stage in which negotiation ethics become critical.
The ethical questions arise in two very different ways: first, how much of the
surplus should an ethical negotiator seek to capture? And second, how much
candor should a negotiator employ when attempting to find a mutually
acceptable settlement point?
Determining and then concealing a reservation point is the critical
component of any negotiation. Indeed, one commentator has described the
BATNA as "the most important source of power in negotiation." 40 A party's
success at the negotiating table depends on trying to convince the other side
that one's BATNA is much more favorable than it actually is.41 As a

corollary, revealing one's BATNA is almost guaranteed to ensure that the
other side will be able to capture the lion's share of the surplus. 42 Thus,
although puffery and other deceptions will occur in various aspects of a
negotiation, a negotiator can almost always expect to see misrepresentation
about the other side's BATNA or reservation price. 43
C.

The Reservation Prices of Low-income Litigants are Particularly
Sensitive Information

As explained above in Section II.B, settlement authorization is a critical
aspect of negotiations. Indeed, one of the central purposes of a negotiation is
to influence the adversary's perceptions about where your client is likely to
settle.44

&

37. Id. at 1804.
38. Id. at 1798-99.
39. Id. at 1799.
40. LEIGH THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR 138 (2d ed. 2001).
41. Id.
42. See id. ("For these reasons, we caution the negotiator to only reveal his BATNA if
he is prepared for the other party to make an offer that is minimally superior to his BATNA.").
43. See generally id. ("[A]lluding to options that you do not actually have is
misrepresentation.").
44. See GIFFORD, supra note 29, at 99 ("[T]he purpose of competitive information
gathering tactics is to determine the other party's 'bottom line."'); see also Peter C. Cramton
J. Gregory Dees, PromotingHonesty in Negotiations, in WHAT'S FAIR, supra note 1, at 115
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Thus, asking direct questions about settlement authorization during a
negotiation is an attempt to conduct an end run around the substance of most
negotiations. If a defendant could simply ask a plaintiffs lawyer whether its
lowball offer is within the client's settlement range-and expect an honest
answer then the lawyer's effort to negotiate for a higher amount is
undermined.45
Settlement authorization is likely to be a particularly sensitive issue for a
low-income plaintiff. Persons without savings or other resources will be
more willing to accept a quick settlement in order to pay basic living
expenses. This is particularly true if the nature of the plaintiffs claim is
resulting in daily costs or losses for a low-income plaintiff. For example, an
employment discrimination plaintiff who has been terminated unfairly may
be without a paycheck while struggling to find new employment. A personal
injury plaintiff may be incurring uninsured medical costs or taking unpaid
leave from work while recovering. A car accident victim may not be injured,
but may be left with a totaled car and no way to get to work.
As Philip Schrag has argued, Model Rule 1.8(e) worsens already
precarious situations by prohibiting lawyers from providing financial
assistance to their clients, other than litigation costs.46 Some examples

identified by Schrag of lawyers who have been disciplined for providing
small loans to their clients underscore the dire straits these clients are in:
one lawyer was suspended for loaning a client $712 to pay for food and
other necessities,47 while another lawyer was publicly reprimanded for
loaning an indigent personal injury client $1200 for automobile repairs, in
part so that he could get to medical appointments.48
For low-income clients with few resources, prompt resolution of their
claim may be a critical first step to getting their lives on track. 49 The number

(explaining that negotiations continue until the marginal cost of continuing exceeds the
marginal benefit; thus, it is helpful to convince your adversary that any further concessions
will be small); James K. Sebenius, Three Ethical Issues in Negotiation, in WHAT'S FAIR,
supra note 1, at 7 ("The essence of much bargaining involves changing another's perceptions
of where in fact one would settle.").
45. See White, supra note 15, at 96 (stating that "[a] truthful answer . . concludes the
negotiation and dashes any possibility of negotiating" a more favorable settlement).
46. See generally Schrag, supra note 5, at 40 ("Model Rule 1.8(e) . . is at odds with the
legal profession's goal of facilitating access to justice. This rule bars lawyers from assisting
their low-income litigation clients with living expenses, such as food, shelter and medicine,
though such clients may suffer or even die while waiting for a favorable litigation result.").
47. Att'y Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Engerman, 424 A.2d 362, 366-67 (Md. 1981).
48. Att'y Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Kandel, 563 A.2d 387, 387-88 (Md. 1989).
49. See, e.g., Schrag, supra note 5, at 44 (relating stories from Georgetown's asylum
law clinic, where clients are frequently homeless and sometimes lack the funds necessary to be
able to communicate with their lawyers by phone or take the bus to meet with them in person).
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of families living paycheck to paycheck in this country is staggering, 50 and
the cost of obtaining the money necessary to pay basic living expenses is
prohibitive.' In many cases, prompt settlement of a client claim is the only
realistic option, even if it means accepting a lower dollar amount than the
client could otherwise receive by pursuing the litigation.
D.

The Application ofRule 4.1 to Settlement Authorization

The literature is divided on how Rule 4.1 applies to settlement
52
authorization.
Comment 2 explains that under "generally accepted
conventions in negotiation," some assertions in negotiation are not
considered statements of material fact; thus, the scope of Rule 4.1 is more
limited in a negotiation setting. 53 Moreover, Comment 2 notes that "a party's
intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are ordinarily" not
considered material statements.54 Some have taken this to mean that lawyers
have carte blanche to lie about settlement authority.
However, the ABA has indicated that there is a difference between
"intentional vagueness regarding a negotiating party's 'bottom line" 56 and a
deliberate misrepresentation of a client's settlement authority. The former

50. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYs., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC
WELL-BEING OF AMERICAN HOUSEHOLDS IN 2014, at 1, 18 (2015) (showing that 47% of
families would have difficulty covering an unexpected expense of $400).
51. See generally Derek Thompson, When You're Poor, Money Is Expensive, THE
ATLANTIC, July 14, 2014, at 1 (explaining how a $450 payday loan trapped a couple into "a
cycle of dependency" in which they racked up $1700 in fees).
52. Monroe H. Freedman, In Praise of Overzealous Representation Lying to Judges,
Deceiving Third Parties, and Other Ethical Conduct, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 771, 778 (2006).
53. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4.1 cmt. 2.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 52, at 778 (arguing that Comment 2 allows a lawyer
with settlement authority of $75,000 to state that his client "is insisting on no less than
$200,000"); see also Meltsner & Schrag, supra note 10, at 210 (encouraging lawyers for lowincome clients to convince their adversary they do not have settlement authority and that they
will be unlikely to obtain it). Even commentators who believe that this sort of posturing is
permissible recognize that there is a fine line between puffery and a statement of material fact.
David Geronemus, Lies, Damn Lies and Unethical Lies: How to Negotiate Ethically and
Effectively, 6 BUS. L. TODAY 10, 11, 14-16 (May-June 1997) (stating that negotiators should
never trust their adversary's statements about a bottom line).
56. Ausherman v. Bank ofAm. Corp., 212 F. Supp. 2d 435, 446 (D. Md. 2002).
57. ABA Comm'n on Ethics & Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-370 (1993) ("[A]
party's actual bottom line or the settlement authority given to a lawyer is a material fact.").
For an example of the slender distinction, compare Richmond, supra note 15, at 269 (arguing
that it is ethical for an attorney to say, "I can't do that" in response to a settlement offer, even
when the offer is in fact within the client's authorization), with id. at 285 (telling a magistrate
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falls within Comment 2's guidance about permissible negotiation tactics,
while the latter violates Rule 4.1. Based on the ABA's opinion, many
scholars believe that it is unethical to make statements that directly
misrepresent the settlement authorization that a client has given to a
lawyer.58 The fact that there is significant disagreement about the basic issue
of whether Rule 4.1 permits a false answer to this question indicates, at the
very least, that the rule should be clarified.59
Still, others have argued that the precise application of Rule 4.1 is
largely irrelevant 60 because questions about settlement authority can simply
be dodged or deflected.61 For example, Judge Richard Shell explains that it
is perfectly fair to respond to questions with the non-answer, "I'm not at
liberty to say." 62 Similarly, the ABA has explained that it is ethical for a
lawyer to "downplay a client's willingness to compromise, or present a
client's bargaining position without disclosing the client's 'bottom line."' 63
But short-circuiting the ethical question is unsatisfactory because it may
64
signal to your adversary that the answer is not favorable to your client.
After all, if the answer were favorable to your client, why wouldn't you give
one? 65 So-called "blocking techniques" 66 can easily backfire because they

&

during a settlement conference that an offer is your client's "top dollar" is a misstatement of
material fact that violates Model Rule 3.3).
58. See generally Boskey, supra note 29, at 8, 17 ("[M]any legal scholars take the view
that one should not offer or respond with a false bottom line."); see also William H. Hodes,
Truthfulness and Honesty among American Lawyers: Perception, Reality, and the Professional
Reform Initiative, 53 S.C. L. REV. 527, 542 (2002) (stating that a false response to a direct
question about settlement authority violates Rule 4.1).
59. See Hodes, supra note 58, at 542 (criticizing the prohibition against lying about
settlement authority as "notoriously weak").
60. See generally Richard Shell, Bargainingwith the Devil Without Losing Your Soul,
in WHAT'S FAIR, supra note 1, at 60, 73 (providing a list of possible answers to settlement
questions that do not violate Rule 4.1).
61. See, e.g., id. at 60, 73 (noting that often in the face of inconvenient questions,
negotiators are forced to use verbal feints and dodges such as "I don't know about that," or
"This is not a subject I'm at liberty to discuss").
62. Id. at 60.
63. ABA Comm'n. on Ethics & Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-439, at 6 (2006).
64. White, supra note 15, at 96 ("Even a moment's hesitation in response to the
question may be a non-verbal communication . .. that [a client] has given such authority.").
65. Id. at 97 ("[I]n that case an honest answer about the absence of authority is a quick
and effective method of changing the opponent's settling point. . . ."); see also Cramton
Dees, supra note 44, at 114 (explaining that it is useful to share inside information like a
reservation point if it will not result in exploitation by the other side).
66. James Freund, Smart Negotiating: How to Make Good Deals in the Real World, in
WHAT'S FAmR, supra note 1, at 213-14.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol68/iss1/3

12

McDermott: Negotiating on Behalf of Low-Income Clients: The Distorting Effec
2016]

NEGOTIATING ON BEHALF OF LOW-INCOME CLIENTS

13

alert your adversary to the fact that you are unwilling to disclose sensitive
-67
information.
For these reasons, misleading your adversary about your real bottom
68
line is one of the most commonly accepted forms of deceit in negotiation.
Thus, any suggestion that Rule 4.1 prohibits even outright falsehoods about
settlement authority puts lawyers' professional obligations at odds with their
clients' commonly used tactics.
III. THE CRITIQUES OF RULE 4.1

This section argues that the conventional wisdom regarding Rule 4.1 is
flawed. Part A discusses the results of an in-class negotiation exercise in
which the threat of strict enforcement of Rule 4.1 impeded settlement. Part B
tries to explain this result, drawing on negotiation theory to argue that strict
rules governing truthfulness may chill settlement discussions and therefore
hurt all parties. Part C explains why strict enforcement of Rule 4.1 leads to
particularly unfair outcomes for low-income litigants.
A.

The SurprisingResults of a Class Exercise

My criticism of Rule 4.1 has an unlikely genesis: a classroom exercise
69
designed to teach the value of Rule 4.1 in a negotiation setting.
As part of an in-class simulation, I developed a pre-litigation negotiation
scenario in which both parties had strong incentives for quick settlement.
The scenario involved an on-the-job injury sustained by a construction
worker who was being paid off the books. The injured worker needed
money, while the construction company wanted to settle the matter quickly
to avoid having its unlawful practices aired in an insurance coverage dispute.

67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Roy J. Lewicki & Robert J. Robinson, Ethical and Unethical Bargaining
Tactics: An Empirical Study, in WHAT'S FAIR, supra note 1, at 224-31 (conducting surveys of
business students, where hiding the real bottom line was seen as one of the most likely tactics
and most ethically appropriate).
69. Although I teach doctrinal courses, I try to incorporate skills exercises to the extent
possible. In particular, I believe that negotiation skills are critical to every type of law practice,
and therefore try to incorporate at least one negotiation exercise into each doctrinal course.
Because I expected that a strict truthfulness requirement would lead to an increased likelihood
of settlement, I scheduled a negotiation exercise for my Professional Responsibilities course
during the week when I was teaching Rule 4.1. I hoped that the results would underscore to
students the inherent value of truthfulness. Instead, I was surprised to see the opposite effect.
Fortunately for my broader purposes, I had not predicted the results in advance to students and
did not need to devote class time to discussing the disparity in outcomes.
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However, discussions were complicated by two factors: there was a very
narrow window for settlement ($90,000-100,000) and both parties started
with unrealistic settlement expectations ($250,000/$25,000). Tempering
these expectations required facts that were in the adversary's exclusive
control. Plaintiff needed to know the extent of Defendant's insurance
coverage, while Defendant needed to know the actual value of Plaintiff's out
of pocket expenses. In other words, the parties needed to be able to
communicate candidly in order to get into settlement range.
I divided the class into two ethics regimes, each representing an
extreme: one set of students negotiated in a jurisdiction where any
misrepresentation as to material facts violated Rule 4.1; the second set
negotiated in a jurisdiction where lawyers had carte blanche to bluff their
way to settlement. I expected that the students in the first regime would be
more likely to reach a settlement, because they could trust that they were
obtaining accurate information about key facts.
In fact, I was surprised to find that the opposite was true. Students in the
second regime all reached a settlement within the stated range, despite
awareness that their opponent was free to bluff about key facts. In contrast,
only half of the students in the first regime settled. The students who did not
settle reported that they were so unnerved by the strict application of Rule
4.1 and so afraid of giving up information that could hurt their clients that
they were unable to engage in substantive discussion about the facts. In other
words, my expectation that Rule 4.1 would enhance settlement by promoting
candor was wrong, because I had failed to anticipate the possibility that it
would instead promote silence and impede settlement.
Inspired by this exercise, I decided to review the literature on
negotiation theory to try to explain this result. As Part B shows, the theory
supports the proposition that a strict ethics regime may impede settlement.
B.

The ChillingEffect of Rule 4.1

As a general matter, indeterminate rules that are backed by sanctions for
egregious conduct can be helpful for enforcing ethical conduct.70 When the
line between sanctionable and permissible conduct is not entirely clear, in
most cases, regulated individuals will err on the side of caution. 7 ' However,
indeterminate rules regarding truthfulness in the negotiation context may not

70. See generally Irma S. Russell, The Evolving Regulation of the Legal Profession:
The Costs of Indeterminacy and Certainty, 2008 PROF. LAW. 137, 138-43 (2008) (explaining
that the indeterminacy of the rule gives courts vast flexibility).
71. See id. at 142-43 ("Staying well away from 'the line' of questionable tactics is
'good business."').
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have the same salutary effect. Indeed, many lawyers believe that false
statements are quite prevalent in negotiations, due in part to the uncertainty
surrounding the application of truthfulness duties. 72 Thus, the indeterminate
duties under Rule 4.1 may not have the broad impact that is generally seen
with common law rules.
Moreover, in addition to lacking broad effectiveness, an indeterminate
rule may have a chilling effect on those lawyers who do try to steer clear of
the ethical line during negotiations. This section introduces several
frameworks for negotiation theory to explain why an indeterminate rule
requiring candor in negotiations can lead to suboptimal outcomes in
negotiations.
In his groundbreaking book, Barriers to Conflict Resolution, Robert
Mnookin describes three types of barriers to negotiation: strategic,
psychological, and structural.73 Strategic barriers arise when one or both
parties' efforts to gain a tactical advantage make it more difficult to find a
mutually advantageous solution.74 Psychological barriers arise when
negotiators have unconscious biases that interfere with their ability to
recognize an optimal resolution for themselves. Finally, structural barriers
occur when the conditions of the broader context of the negotiation impede
76
the parties' ability to reach a resolution.
A strict ethics regime that impedes negotiations would likely fall into
the third category of structural barriers. When negotiating in a regime in
which Rule 4.1 is strictly enforced, there is a risk that negotiators will err on
the side of caution and give away less information that they otherwise

72. See, e.g., GIFFORD, supra note 29, at 113 n.20 (explaining that surveys show
between 18-28% of lawyers believe that misrepresentations occur regularly or frequently in
negotiations).
73. ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 1082 (1995).
74. See generally DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS
NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 30-32 (1986)
(acknowledging the idea that there are two types of negotiators: "value creators," and "value
claimers"; the former seeks joint gains for all negotiating parties, while the latter seeks to have
one winner and one loser in any negotiation).
75. See generally Robert C. Bordone et al., The Negotiation Within: The Impact of
Internal Conflict over Identity and Role on Across-the-Table Negotiations, 2014 J. DISP.
RESOL. 175, 177 (2014) (noting that these barriers, or the negotiators' unconscious cognitive
biases, may prevent the parties from recognizing that an agreement was mutually
advantageous to begin with). One common example is "loss aversion," a cognitive bias in
which the risk of losing takes on increased significance to the point where it often outweighs
an even greater likelihood of gain. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices,
Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 342 (1984) (explaining the intuition that a
loss of $X is more aversive than a gain of $X is attractive).
76. See generally Bordone et al., supra note 75, at 177 (explaining that barriers may
prevent negotiators from obtaining the necessary information to make sound decisions).
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would. In turn, this reciprocal effect of holding back information prevents
Without the
the parties from fully exploring a bargaining situation.
exchange of information, "genuine bargaining" cannot get underway.7 8
More recent literature on barriers has identified a new framework for
analyzing obstacles to optimal resolutions: "the negotiation within."79 In
their 2014 article, Robert Bordone, Tobias Berkman, and Sara del Nido
describe three types of internal conflicts that may prevent a party to a
negotiation from being able to pursue his or her best interests at the
bargaining table.80 They identify three types of internal conflicts:
aspirational identity conflicts, in which the negotiator is seeking to embody
two or more conflicting roles; 8' valenced identity conflicts, in which the
negotiator's internal views of positive and negative values skew his or her
ability to pursue an optimal outcome;82 and transformative identity conflicts,
which arise when a negotiation awakens fears and uncertainty about the
future role of one of the parties.83
A lawyer negotiating under a strict ethics regime faces an aspirational
84
identity conflict. On the one hand, the lawyer wants to achieve the best
result for his client (and indeed, is bound by competence rules like Model
Rule 1.1 to do so).85 But on the other hand, the lawyer may be anxious about
86
the ethical repercussions of certain negotiating strategies. In essence, the
lawyer is facing a conflict between personal well-being and the well-being
of his client. By choosing a negotiation strategy that avoids violating Rule
4.1, the lawyer may end up undermining his client's interest.

77. See GIFFORD, supra note 29, at 99 ("Frequently, when negotiators discuss their
needs and aspirations, and begin to exchange information, this signals the beginning of
genuine bargaining.").
78. Id.
79. Bordone et al., supra note 75, at 178.
80. Id. at 176 & n. 1 (citing BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 8 (Kenneth Arrow et
al. eds., 1995)).
81. Id. at 184.
82. See id. at 187-88 (noting that valenced identities occur when a negotiator's positive
and negative views of himself or herself come into conflict, resulting in failed negotiation
outcomes).
83. See id. at 189-91.
84. Bordone et al., supra note 75, at 186.
85. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR AsS'N 2014).
86. Roger Fisher suggests that this same dilemma arises even without the threat of
sanctions, arguing that the lawyer's dilemma arises from "a conflict of interest between the
lawyer's obligation to the client . . . and two of the lawyer's other interests: behaving
honorably toward others . . .and self-interest in preserving reputation and self-esteem." Roger
Fisher, A Code of Negotiation Practicesfor Lawyers, in WHAT'S FAIR, supra note 1, at 23.
However, my class exercise suggests that the conflict may be heightened when there is an
express threat of sanctions.
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Bordone and his coauthors explain that when a negotiator faces this sort
of competing loyalty, it can lead to inhibited performance at the negotiating
table, including paralysis.
Indeed, of the three identity conflicts,
aspirational identity conflict is "particularly fraught" because it puts the
negotiator in an untenable position that appears purely distributive. The
seemingly stark choice between "self' and "other" leads to negative
emotions, such as anxiety and helplessness that can further inhibit
negotiations.89
The effect of Bordone's predicted conflicts is underscored by research
from other disciplines indicating that even slight changes in mood have a
significant impact on performance. 90 Moreover, although Bordone's models
of internal conflict apply generally to any type of negotiator, the emotional
impact may well be starker among lawyers. Indeed, lawyers are much more
susceptible to anxiety and obsessiveness than other professionals. 9 1 Thus,
while Bordone proposes methods a negotiator can use to manage the internal
conflict,92 these methods may be less effective for lawyers who already

struggle with negative emotions. In short, to the extent that ethical rules
create an aspirational identity conflict, the impact of this conflict on lawyers
is likely to be magnified.
So far, these theories have addressed the psychological aspects of
negotiating. A third set of theories melds the psychological to the practical
and addresses how certain approaches can advance or impede information
flow. 93 This theoretical approach starts from the premise that communication

is critical in negotiations, particularly those in which an integrative
resolution would benefit the parties more than a mere distributive

87. Bordone et al., supra note 75, at 186.
88. Id. at 213.
89. Id. at 186.
90. See generally Clark Freshman et al., The Lawyer-Negotiator as Mood Scientist,
2002 J. DIsP. RESOL. 1, 12-15 (2002) (summarizing studies that demonstrate the impact of
improved mood on performance).
91. Id. at 45, 45-46 n.214; see also Jonathan R. Cohen, When People Are the Means:
Negotiating with Respect, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 764-65 n.74 (2001) (stating that
lawyers have "exceptionally high levels of psychologically distress").
92. See Bordone et al., supra note 75, at 192, 200 (outlining the typical approaches a
negotiator can use to manage internal conflict, such as denial, avoidance, suppression, and
resignation, and suggesting a new approach called "integration").
93. See, e.g., Janice Nadler, Rapport in Legal Negotiation: How Small Talk Can
Facilitate E-mail Dealmaking, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 223, 225 (2004) (discussing how
small talk and building rapport can improve e-mail negotiations).
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resolution.94 Because the exchange of information is usually necessary to
explore the possibility of integrative solutions, factors that increase the flow
of information are seen as desirable in a negotiation context. 95
Scholars who focus on information as a key ingredient recognize that
there are many barriers to the free exchange of information, leading to the
so-called "negotiator's dilemma." 9 6 In this common scenario, a negotiator
becomes overly focused on the risk of disclosing too much information or
giving away the wrong piece of information.97 The fear that an adversary
will be able to exploit an uneven exchange of information encourages each
side to limit disclosures, which in turn impedes the information flow
necessary to identify integrative solutions.98
Indeed, feedback from my students suggested that the negotiator's
dilemma was at work in the regime that applied Rule 4.1 strictly. The
prospect of discipline for statements made during negotiations increased the
students' level of caution about what they disclosed and made them feel like
they had very little latitude in terms of how they framed those disclosures.
As a result, both sides were reluctant to undermine their negotiating position
by disclosing too much of their client's private information. With neither
side willing to share the critical information necessary to reach an integrative
solution, negotiations stalled.
In designing this classroom exercise, I had expected that a strict ethics
regime would create a sense of trust between negotiators, leading to
increased likelihood of reaching a mutually beneficial settlement and
avoiding trial. 99 But this was not what happened. In fact, empirical research
suggests that increased information flows and improved outcomes are a
product of interpersonal factors, rather than factors external to the
negotiation. 0 0 According to the academic literature, there are three different
ways to establish effective information flow.' 0

94. See, e.g., id. at 249 ("Often in negotiation, reaching an agreement may be difficult
because it is unclear whether a mutually beneficial solution is possible; negotiators must
exchange enough information to ascertain that positive bargaining zone exists.").
95. See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 40, at 68-69 (noting that negotiators who build
trusting relationships, ask the other party about his or her preferences, and share information
are more likely to reach integrative agreements).
96. LAx & SEBENIUS, supra note 74, at 38-46.
97. See id. at 38 (noting that negotiators in a "negotiator's dilemma" become afraid that
the other side will exploit them if they share information).
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Cramton & Dees, supra note 44, at 111 (hypothesizing that mutual trust
creates a basis for ethical behavior, while suspicion that you are being deceived can destroy it).
Moreover, when verification is possible, trust is enhanced. Id. at 116-18.
100. See generally Jason Scott Johnston & Joel Waldfogel, Does Repeat Play Elicit
Cooperation? Evidence from Federal Civil Litigation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 44 (2002)
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First, a past relationship from prior dealings typically improves
settlement outcomes, both in terms of the number and the time invested in
negotiations.102 Importantly, this is true even when the past relationship was
adversarial: the significant factor is not how much the lawyers like each
other based on past dealings, but rather how effectively the lawyers have
learned to communicate with one another.1 03 The more interactions the
lawyers have had, the easier it becomes to share critical information.104
Second, when negotiators do not have a prior relationship, other efforts
to develop rapport between negotiators can improve information flow.

05

For

example, researchers have shown that non-verbal factors like body position,
eye contact, and head nodding can contribute to rapport.106 Even just
mirroring the behavior of the negotiator across the table can add to rapport
and increase trust between negotiators. 0 7
A third factor that benefits negotiations, particularly in situations in
which there is neither a prior relationship nor an opportunity for face-to-face
contact, is small talk.1os In an email negotiation experiment conducted
between law students at two different schools, Janice Nadler found that
students who engaged in light email exchanges before addressing the subject
of their dealings were able to develop a rapport and improve their
performance over students who launched straight into the negotiation. 109
The literature on building trust in negotiations suggests that purely
external indicators of trustworthiness play no real role in improving
information flow."1 0 Indeed, none of the three ways to build rapport depend
on the negotiator's ability to gauge the accuracy of the information being

(finding that prior dealings can improve information flow); Nadler, supra note 93, at 228-29
(finding that non-verbal factors and small talk can improve information flow).
101. Johnston & Walfogel, supra note 100, at 44.
102. Id. at 40-41.
103. See id. at 45 (noting that attorneys with past interaction with each other learn to
communicate, which leads to more effective cooperation).
104. See id. at 59 (noting that attorneys that frequently litigate against each other are able
to eliminate "information asymmetries").
105. See Nadler, supra note 93, at 228-29 (noting that non-verbal or preverbal behavior
can help build rapport).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 229.
108. Id. at 225.
109. Id. at 235-39.
110. See generally Johnston & Waldfogel, supra note 100, at 44 (finding that prior
dealings can improve information flow); Nadler, supra note 93, at 228-29 (finding that nonverbal factors and small talk can improve information flow).
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shared." While it is possible that this factor may be implicit in situations in
which the lawyers have had repeat dealings with each other, the key factor
identified by the researchers is trust in reciprocity,112 not necessarily trust in
the accuracy of the information that is being shared.113
More significantly, the mechanisms used to establish trust in new
negotiating relationships are inherently untrustworthy.1 4 For example, using
small talk as a way to build trust is paradoxical in that polite chit chat is
widely considered "costless, non-binding, and non-verifiable."" 5
Nonetheless, polite conversation that is disconnected from the purpose of the
negotiation is critical to building trust.116 Similarly, flattery can be an

effective method of building trust-even when negotiators are aware that the
flatterer has ulterior motives.' 1 7 In sum, information flow seems to depend
largely on interpersonal methods of building trust that are not verifiable, as
opposed to imposing external pressure to provide accurate information.'' 8
To the contrary, this external pressure may undermine rapport to the extent
that it leads to the negotiator's dilemma and chills communications.' 19

111. See generally Johnston & Waldfogel, supra note 109, at 228-29 (discussing prior
dealings); Nadler, supra note 93 (discussing non-verbal factors and small talk).
112. The "reciprocity effect" predicts that a lawyer who has successfully negotiated
against a colleague in the past will be more willing to make concessions or disclosures in
future negotiations out of a sense of fairness. See Freshman, Hayes, & Feldman, supra note 90,
at 27-28 (noting that the reciprocity effect occurs when one person makes a concession or
shares certain information, causing the other person to want to reciprocate in a similar
manner).
113. Cf Brian C. Gunia et al., Trust Me, I'm a Negotiator:Diagnosing Trust to Negotiate
Effectively, Globally, 43 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 27, 28 (2014) (outlining some of the
other factors besides trust in the accuracy of information that can influence trust).
114. See Freshman et al., supra note 90, at 27-28 (outlining some reasons people decide
to trust others, such as culture, personality, past experiences, the immediate environment, and
the social behavior of others).
115. Nadler, supra note 93, at 223 (citing Vincent P. Crawford & Joel Sobel, Strategic
Information Transmission, 50 ECONOMETRICA 1431, 1450 (1982)).
116. See THOMPSON, supra note 40, at 129 ("[O]n a preconscious level, schmoozing has
a dramatic impact on our liking and trust of others.").
117. Id.
118. But see Howard Raiffa, Negotiation Analysis, in WHAT'S FAIR, supra note 1, at 2021 (arguing that visible acts of kindness, though self-serving, are also beneficial because of the
"contagion factor" of acting nobly).
119. See, e.g., LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 74, at 38-41 (discussing the negotiator's
dilemma).
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The ParticularHarms to Low-Income Litigants

The outcome of my class negotiation exercise bothered me for a second
reason: the possibility that a duty of truthfulness chilled negotiations resulted
in a disproportionately poor outcome for the low-income plaintiff. I had
designed an exercise in which both sides valued a quick settlement and
derived benefits from reaching a resolution. However, the construction
company's benefit was simply a monetary gain. By reaching a quick
settlement, the company would be covered by insurance and would therefore
avoid a loss. In contrast, the benefit to the worker was not really a benefit at
all: the worker needed the settlement money in order to be able to pay for
necessary medical treatment. The possibility that Rule 4.1 chilled settlement
meant that the defendant experienced a lost benefit, but the plaintiff was
actually hurt. This was a particularly troubling result to me.
This section helps explain why this result is troubling from an ethical
perspective. At the outset, negotiation is unique in terms of the lack of
structure and oversight.120 Applying general ethical rules in the negotiation
context is particularly challenging, because unlike litigation, there is rarely a
judge or other mediator overseeing either the process or the result.121 Nor is
there anyone to police its fairness, except at the margins.1 22
One exception is the requirement that courts independently review
settlements involving a minor.123 A helpful example comes from the
Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Spaulding v. Zimmerman.124 In
Spaulding, defense attorneys withheld a medical report indicating that the

120. Norton, supra note 9, at 272. See also Boskey, supra note 29, at 8, 17 (explaining
that because negotiations take place in private, negotiators may feel more freedom to engage in
unethical conduct); Steele, supra note 27, at 1387 (noting that instead of the framework of
rules governing civil litigators, negotiators are governed only by "primitive and obtuse rules of
professional responsibility and . .. an amorphous set of professional mores").
121. But see generally Kristine Gamboa, Positive Prognosisfor Judges: A Look into
Judge-DirectedNegotiations in Medical Malpractice Cases, 13 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 235
(2013) (discussing the use of judge-directed negotiations in medical malpractice litigation and
suggesting the use of judge-directed negotiations in other types of tort cases).
122. See, e.g., Norton, supra note 9, at 270-71 ("Negotiation is dominated by process
and technique, unguided by any specific consensus as to how ethical standards and norms
should be applied to a process that tolerates the disguising of intentions and the use of pressure
tactics.").
123. See Brian C. Haussmann, Note, The ABA Ethical Guidelines for Settlement
Negotiations: Exceeding the Limits of the Adversarial Ethic, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1218, 1219
(2004) (citing Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704, 709-11 (Minn. 1962)) (noting that
because Spaulding was a minor, his settlement had to be approved by the trial court).
124. Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d at 706.
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16-year old plaintiff had a life-threatening aneurysm.125 While the nondisclosure resulted in a lower settlement, it also prevented the plaintiff from
obtaining immediate treatment.126 Fortunately, the injury was detected two
years later before it could cause further harm.127 After the facts relating to
the non-disclosure emerged, the plaintiff sought to reopen the case, arguing
that the defense attorneys had acted unethically in withholding the medical
report.128 But the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected this argument,
explaining that in a typical adversarial setting, defense lawyers had no duty
to disclose this information to the plaintiff.1 29
However, all was not lost for Spaulding: because he was a minor at the
time of settlement, the trial court had an independent duty to evaluate the
fairness of the settlement.1 30 The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that
the reviewing court did not have adequate factual information when it
approved the settlement, and therefore the case had to be reopened.131
But Spaulding is the exception that proves the rule, because his relief
was dependent on the fact that he was a minor.132 In contrast, most plaintiffs
in Spaulding's position would have no recourse for harms caused by parties
who choose to elevate the adversarial process over basic human decency. 133
In light of the absence of any real oversight in most settlements, a key
question in negotiation ethics is the extent to which they take into account
disparities in the power and status of the negotiating parties. 134 Some have
argued that an imprecisely calibrated ethical framework may in fact
exacerbate the power and status differences that are likely to lead to unfair
negotiation outcomes.1 35 This problem is particularly stark in the case of
low-income clients for three reasons.136

125. Id. at 707-08.
126. See id. at 707-08 (discussing how Spaulding did not find out about his medical
condition until two years after the settlement was reached).
127. Id. at 708.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 709.
130. Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d at 709.
131. Id. at 710-11.
132. Id. at 709.
133. See generally Haussmann, supra note 123, at 1219 (arguing that the adversarial
ethic led to "reprehensible" results in the Spaulding case).
134. See, e.g., Norton, supra note 9, at 270 (noting that negotiation raises questions of
whether power or status disparities negatively affect outcomes).
13 5. Id.
136. See id. at 270-71 (explaining that those who are "poor, poorly informed, or
otherwise disadvantaged in relation to their opponents" are more likely to face unfair results in
the absence of institutional legal protections).
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First, to the extent that negotiations are viewed as an opportunity to
reach a win-win outcome, a client's precarious financial situation may
undermine the likelihood of achieving this goal. Indeed, in one critique of
the much-lauded theory of integrative bargaining, Gerald Wetlaufer
identified several factors that reduce the possibility that negotiations can
serve to expand the pie and lead to resolutions that benefit both sides.13 7
Several of the factors identified by Wetlaufer would be more likely to apply
in situations in which a low-income individual is negotiating against a
financially stable adversary. 138 For example, Wetlaufer argues that
integrative bargaining typically contains some element of risk-taking in
terms of predicting future outcomes;1 39 when parties have different risk
preferences, one party may be unwilling to take on the degree of risk
necessary to achieve the integrative benefits.1 40 In these cases, the size of the
pie may shrink rather than grow.141 As explained above in Section I.C, lowincome clients are likely to have a relatively low risk tolerance.
Second, even if integrative bargaining is still possible, low-income
clients may systematically be exploited by an adversary's well-founded
assumptions about their financial situation. The clearest example is the
extent to which the parties' time preferences regarding payment or
performance are a factor in negotiations.142 As a general matter, making a
discounted payment today to an adversary who places a high value on
immediate payment is considered an integrative solution that has expanded
the pie.143 This makes sense when the parties that are still too far apart on
numbers can reach resolution by using the timing of performance to bridge
the gap. But are these time preferences ever going to lead to integrative
solutions in the case of low-income plaintiffs, who predictably require a
quick payout in every instance? As Wetlaufer points out, a "hard bargainer"
may always be able to use time preferences to his advantage. 144 Arguably,
the plaintiffs obvious preference for an early payout will consistently put

137. Wetlaufer, supra note 1, at 392 (arguing that "cooperation, openness, and
truthtelling" do not lead to resolutions that benefit both sides).
138. Id. at 38-44 (asserting that buyers with differing risk assessments, possible
economies in scale, and differences in capabilities between parties will not create opportunities
for integrative bargaining).
139. Id. at 38-40 (stating that examples of risks in integrative bargaining include
predicting future demand for a product or service, estimating the longevity and use value of
certain items, and betting on future stock prices).
140. Id. at 42-43.
141. Id. at 43.
142. Wetlaufer, supra note 1, at 43-44 (quoting LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 74, at 32).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 44.
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him at a disadvantage, allowing a financially stable "hard bargainer" to
consistently shrink the size of the pie even further to its own advantage.
Wetlaufer concludes that encouraging openness and truth-telling may be
beneficial in situations in which it leads to integrative bargaining.1 45
However, in light of dynamics that likely shrink the size of the pie, honesty
can sometimes lead to disintegrative bargaining.1 46 The fact that a client has
authorized a quick, lowball settlement is in some ways the ultimate "honest"
disclosure that is likely to lead to pie-shrinking, because it showcases the
client's low tolerance for risk and high preference for immediate
performance.1 47 Both of these factors are likely to lead to a disintegrative
bargain and a result that some may consider fundamentally unfair.1 48
Third, the precarious financial situation of low-income clients raises
fundamental questions about whether they have the same free will or agency
that we usually attribute to participants in a negotiation.1 49 This lack of
agency tends to undermine any attempts to universalize negotiation ethics. 1o
For example, Eleanor Holmes Norton proposes a functionalist model of
negotiation ethics that rests on four basic assumptions about the role and
purpose of bargaining.
Her final assumption conceives of negotiation as
"an adversarial market process" involving "willing opponents."1 52 It is

highly questionable whether a low-income client who is unable to work or
pay basic expenses due to an injury is a "willing opponent" to a settlement
discussion, at least in the same way we might think of a business looking to
negotiate a contract, or even a personal injury litigant who has the resources
to hold out for trial, if necessary.1 53

145. Id. at 46.
146. Id. at 49.
147. See id. at 35-36 (arguing that the "size of the pie" will vary depending on how
badly and how quickly the clients need the money).
148. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 8, at 591 (noting that vast differences in the bargaining
power of parties can lead to unconscionable settlements).
149. See, e.g., Norton, supra note 9, at 270 (asserting that negotiation "raises
controversial questions about whether power or status, in the absence of formal adjudication,
may impinge upon outcomes").
150. Id. at 271.
151. See id. at 286 (summarizing the assumptions of the functionalist model as follows:
"(1) bargaining is indispensable to the functioning of society; (2) the fundamental purpose of
bargaining is to achieve a valid agreement; (3) practices that threaten the validity of an
agreement violate the fundamental purpose of the process; and (4) bargaining is an adversarial
market process in which willing opponents use partisan strategic dealings to arrive at accurate
information and to obtain fair treatment").
152. Id.
153. Indeed, a low-income client's position at the bargaining table is exacerbated by
another ethical rule, Model Rule 1.8(e), which prohibits lawyers from providing financial
assistance to clients beyond the actual costs of litigation. See generally Schrag, supra note 5, at
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For these reasons, misleading an adversary about your settlement
authority may be critical to helping ensure a fair result for a low-income
client. Indeed, a list of negotiating tactics that is specifically aimed at legal
services and public interest lawyers recommends claiming that the lawyer
does not have authority to settle below a certain point.1 54 And, in case this
claim is not enough to persuade your opponent, lawyers serving low-income
clients are also encouraged to persuade their adversary that they will not be
able to obtain such authority. 5 5 Finally, to avoid undermining this steadfast
message, lawyers for low-income clients are advised not to bring their client
to negotiations.156 In other words, particularly when a low-income client
needs a quick settlement and has privately expressed willingness to accept a
lowball offer, lawyers are encouraged to do all they can to hide these facts in
order to best serve their clients' interests.15 7
Even scholars who advocate most strenuously for increasing rather than
relaxing professional obligations in negotiation understand that there are
situations in which the relative status of the parties in negotiation is likely to
lead to unfair results.15 8 For example, in his seminal article, A Causerie of
Lawyers' Ethics in Negotiation, Judge Alvin Rubin explains that "vast
differences in the bargaining power of the principals" can lead to
unconscionable settlements, particularly where one party is not in a position
to withstand the expense or delay of trial. 159 In these situations, a rule that
prohibits a lawyer from making false or misleading statements about a
client's settlement authorization will increase the risk of an unconscionable
result.1

60

41-49 (discussing the issues that indigent clients face following from lawyers' inability to
provide financial assistance to clients they are representing in litigation under Model Rule 1.8).
154. See Meltsner & Schrag, supra note 10, at 210 (advising that a lawyer should claim
he does not have, and cannot obtain, the authority to compromise beyond a certain point
because it can make a topic non-negotiable and force the other side to make concessions).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See generally id. (describing negotiating techniques that best serve the client).
158. Rubin, supra note 8, at 591.
159. Id.
160. Judge Rubin's analysis raises the difficult question of how to determine when a
negotiation has produced an "unconscionable" result. Some have argued that we can look to an
objective standard, as set forth in the body of law governing unconscionability in contract. See,
e.g., Murray Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, in WHAT'S FAIR,
supra note 1, at 334 (asserting that whether or not a transaction is "unconscionable" is an
objective determination of whether the means and ends would be regarded as unconscionable
under existing law). Although the doctrine of unconscionability often requires extreme
disparities in bargaining power beyond the fact that a plaintiff needs a quick settlement, the
Consumer Financial Protection Board's recent proposal to ban arbitration clauses in consumer
financial contracts could be a major step in expanding black letter law about fairness. See
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Elsewhere, Michael Rubin highlights the stark conflict between lawyers'
duty of candor to the tribunal and the apparent lack of any duty of candor in
negotiations.161 He argues, convincingly, that there is no ethical justification
for this disparity.162 Indeed, the main arguments supporting a relaxed duty of
candor in negotiations stem from a belief that achieving the best outcome for
one's client is the critical value in a negotiation setting.1 63 However, Rubin
posits that there is an overarching duty to the profession that should counsel
in favor of greater ethical duties in the negotiation setting.164 Building on
Judge Rubin's earlier article, he argues that "if the profession is ultimately to
be grounded in ethics and morality . . . we should strive to create rules that

mandate moral and ethical results.' 65
Judge Rubin's words are compelling, yet they simultaneously highlight
the fact that the professional rules sometimes lead to uneven results. Going
back to the scenario of the low-income client who is willing to accept a
lowball offer because she needs money now and does not have time to
negotiate for a higher offer, the rules are what put her attorney in a moral
bind in the first place. It is Rule 1.8(e), rather than any perceived moral and
ethical directive, that prevents the lawyer from being able to pay a client's
living costs during litigation.166 And now, with professional duty having
placed the attorney in a situation in which he has authorization to settle for
an amount that is not fairly representative of the value of his client's claim,
should Rule 4.1 again require him to choose professional interests over
client interest and disclose the low authorization if asked? It is, in essence, a
double whammy for the lawyer representing the low-income client. At least
at the margins, a lawyer's careful adherence to ethical rules could lead to
unconscionable results, in contrast to the moral and ethical results
envisioned by Judge Rubin.
The already uneven playing field looks even worse in light of the fact
that some attorneys can ethically dodge the issue if they postpone obtaining

generally Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Proposes Prohibiting Mandatory
Arbitration Clauses that Deny Groups of Consumers Their Day in Court (May 5, 2016)
(proposing a regulation, designed to protect consumers' rights to their day in court, that would
prohibit mandatory arbitration clauses in new contracts that prevent class action lawsuits
unless they say explicitly that they cannot be used to stop consumers from being part of a class
action in court).
161. Michael H. Rubin, The Ethics of Negotiation:Are There Any?, 56 LA. L. REV. 447,
453-54 (1995).
162. Id. at 475-76 (citing Rubin, supra note 8, at 591).
163. Id at 469.
164. Id. at 470.
165. Id.
166. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.8(e) (AM. BAR Ass'N 1983).
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settlement authority from the client until very late in the negotiation.167 But
such game-playing can easily lead to delay,168 and delay is seldom a good
option when a low-income client needs a settlement check in order to pay
the bills or put food on the table.169 Moreover, delay becomes an even worse
problem when a client is hard to reach,170 perhaps because he is working a
job where he can't take calls, perhaps because she is incarcerated and only
available to speak by phone at certain times of the week, perhaps because he
has been deported.17 1 Thus, with fewer options for ethically avoiding the
Rule 4.1 problem, the ethical lawyer who represents low-income individuals
is at a particular disadvantage.172
Finally, the use of contingent fees may exacerbate the risks already
faced by low-income litigants. Lawyers who accept cases on contingency
may be able to maximize their profits by settling quickly. 173 To the extent
that a lawyer's inclination to settle quickly overlaps with the client's desire
to accept a lowball settlement offer, the lawyer will be more likely to have
entered negotiations with settlement authority and will have less incentive to
prolong negotiations by bluffing about that authority.1 74
Given the uneven playing field when parties have unequal bargaining
power, does it make sense to hold both parties to the same ethical rules? Not

167. See, e.g., White, supra note 15, at 96-97 (proposing that a "clever lawyer" can
simply defer obtaining authorization to settle until late in a negotiation).
168. See id. (suggesting that clever lawyers will advise clients not to grant them authority
until the final stages in negotiation).
169. See Owen M. Fiss, The Case Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984)
(asserting that the low-income party in negotiations has an incentive to settle as a means of
accelerating payment, even if he realizes he will get less money in the moment than if he
awaited judgment).
170. See Carol Ruth Silver, The Imminent Failure of Legal Services for the Poor: Why
and How to Limit Caseload, 46 J. URB. L. 217, 220 (1968) (asserting that lawyers'
communication difficulties with low-income clients during the pursuit of "chronically delayed
justice" creates a major problem during representation).
171. See, e.g., id. at 221 ("[T]he mere mechanics of being poor further complicate the
lawyer-client relationship when appointments are missed because baby-sitting arrangements or
a borrowed car break down or because a functional illiterate could not remember on which day
of the week his appointment was set.").
172. See White, supra note 15, at 91-92 (asserting that the rules are more difficult for an
honest lawyer to follow because by following the rules he puts his client at a significant
disadvantage compared to others who do not follow the rules).
173. See generally Philip J. Havers, Take the Money and Run: Inherent EthicalProblems
of the Contingency Fee and Loser Pays Systems, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
621, 623 (2000) (asserting that because the contingency fee system makes litigation risky and
expensive, those with less money assume the greater risk in any suit).
174. See id. at 630-31 (illustrating that on a contingency fee, an attorney could work less
hours and make a settlement to make a portion of that money rather than "negotiate harder"
work longer hours, and therefore make less return on his money).
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necessarily. For one thing, research suggests that negotiators bargaining
from a position of strength engage in less self-monitoring in negotiation
situations. 7 1 In contrast, those with less bargaining power more carefully
scrutinize the details of an interaction.176 Thus, to the extent that strict
ethical rules have a chilling effect on a negotiator's conduct, 7 7 the effect
may be greater on those who are already negotiating from a position of
weakness.
Furthermore, holding both sides to strict truthfulness rules regarding
settlement authority may not be the correct approach from a moral
perspective either. Some ethicists have pinpointed the moral wrong that
comes from dishonest negotiation tactics: specifically, these tactics lead to a
result that would not have otherwise occurred. 7 8 As Sissela Bok has
explained, the moral problem is that "deceit coerces someone to do
something against their will.',1 79 This is a helpful general guideline for

avoiding immoral forms of deception, but what about negotiations involving
unequal bargaining power? If one party is looking to take advantage of the
inequality by making a lowball offer, then arguably any effort to mask that
inequality and treat the negotiation as a level playing field is a coercive
deceit. But is that deceit immoral, or does it simply prevent one of the
parties from achieving an arguably immoral outcome? This appears to be a
situation in which a false statement about settlement authority is a coercive
practice that prevents an unconscionable result, which in turn creates a
dilemma for those who believe that these outcomes are both at odds with
fundamental fairness. 80
IV. PROPOSALS FOR A FAIRER VERSION OF RULE

4.1

Having explained why the conventional wisdom regarding Rule 4.1
leads to suboptimal outcomes, this section proposes new approaches to Rule
4.1 that do not create the same risks for low-income litigants. Part A presents
a hypothetical to reexamine the boundaries of the truthfulness requirement in
Rule 4.1. Part B draws on ethics theory to help defend the notion of treating

175. THOMPSON, supra note 40, at 142. In one experiment cited by Thompson, groups of
people were recorded during a social function that involved food. Those attendees deemed
high power tended to eat messier foods and show less concern for their appearance. Id.
176. Id.
177. See supra Section II.B.
178. See, e.g., Sissela Bok, Truthfulness, Deceit, and Trust, in WHAT'S FAIR, supra note
1, at 80 (stating that lies distort information and the available choices).
179. Id. at 79.
180. See, e.g., Norton, supra note 9, at 275 ("[B]argaining is unfair when coercive
practices are used or when an unconscionable outcome results.").
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certain categories of information differently. Part C addresses likely
critiques of this approach and explains why these critiques may be less valid
in the context of low-income litigants. Finally, Part D suggests ways to
improve truthfulness by reframing it as an aspirational goal rather than an
indeterminate rule that is policed with sanctions.
A.

Reexamining the BoundariesofRule 4.1

The strictest view of Rule 4.1 starts with the categorical imperative that
one must be truthful at all times.' 8' But a universal rule of truthfulness is
flawed if it sometimes leads to unethical results.1 82 For example, if a
murderer asked you to disclose the location of his intended victim, it would
be unethical to tell the truth and ethical to lie.1 83
Obviously, the ethical dilemmas confronting lawyers are typically far
more nuanced,1 84 so how can we determine whether deceit is ever justified?
The following hypothetical aims to at least start the conversation in the
context of low-income litigants.
Imagine a large manufacturer is faced with a sudden and massive
exposure to product liability suits. The manufacturer would like to settle
these suits rather than litigate, so it invites injured persons to submit their
medical records and await a settlement offer. Injured persons may submit
claims directly, or they may submit their claims through a lawyer. The
manufacturer will then categorize the degree of injury and calculate a
settlement offer. The calculation starts with the same base amount for each
category of injury, but then adjusts it based on the zip code associated with
the claim: offers are adjusted upward for claimants in zip codes with abovemedian incomes, on the theory that these claimants will be more likely to
accept a settlement, while there is a downward adjustment for claimants
from zip codes with lower-median incomes, on the theory that these
claimants are more likely to accept a lowball offer. 8 5

181. See, e.g., Alvin Rubin, supra note 8, at 585 (despairing about the state of ethics in
negotiation and the frequency with which lawyers are encouraged to deceive). But see Michael
Rubin, supra note 161, at 453 (arguing that Model Rule 4.1 does not require truthfulness).
182. Alan Strudler, On the Ethics of Deception in Negotiation, in WHAT'S FAIR, supra
note 1, at 139-40.
183. Id.
184. See generally id. (providing that the ethical dilemma in negotiation may be less
serious than in the murderer analogy).
185. This example is not especially far-fetched, as corporations facing large product
liability costs consider the likelihood that an injured person will have access to a legal remedy
in assessing settlement values. For example, in order to settle breast implant injury claims,
Dow Corning used the Chapter 11 bankruptcy process to pay various classes of injured people
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Setting aside whether the settlement differential is ethical, would it be
ethical for a low-income claimant's lawyer to attempt to game this system?
Four variations of this hypothetical help shed light on the precise ethical
question.
The first variation assumes that it is common practice for lawyers to use
their own address and contact information when submitting claims on their
clients' behalf, and that the manufacturer's submission form doesn't
expressly forbid this practice. The lawyer simply follows his normal practice
and puts his own address without any significant thought. There does not
seem to be any deception in this variation.
The second variation assumes the same facts as the first: namely, that it
is not necessarily deceptive to list the lawyer's own address. But what if the
lawyer makes a considered decision about whether to use his own address or
the client's address, and decides to use his own address in order to give the
client the extra benefit of a higher median income zip code? Here, there is an
intent to mislead the manufacturer. Therefore, the lawyer has started down
the slippery slope toward deceit.
The third variation takes the hypothetical a step further, with a lawyer
who is submitting claims on behalf of several different clients. What if the
lawyer uses the clients' home address only in cases in which the client lives
in an above-median zip code, and his own address for the remaining clients?
Here, the deceit is clear: the lawyer is selectively misleading the
manufacturer in order to gain a tactical advantage for his clients.
Using Bok's conception,186 the lawyer in the second and third variations
has coerced the manufacturer into doing something against its will-i.e.,
offering a higher settlement, and increasing the total payout. But arguably,
the deception leads to a fairer result because it prevents the manufacturer
from being able to exploit potentially unfair and incorrect assumptions about
various claimants' settlement choices. As a result of the lawyer's deception,
the manufacturer is also unable to exploit its superior bargaining power to
the particular detriment of low-income litigants. In this situation, interpreting
Rule 4.1 to allow the dishonesty is arguably necessary to achieving an
87
ethically sound result.

different amounts based on the wealth of their countries and their likely access to civil
remedies. See In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 816
(2002).
186. See Bok, supra note 178, at 79 (stating that deceit and violence can coerce a lawyer
into doing something against his or her will).
187. See also White, supra note 15, at 92 (noting that there may be special considerations
justifying a lie); id. at 97 (noting that it may be acceptable to lie if the question itself is
improper); ef Bok, supra note 178, at 160 (suggesting that people can engage in deception in
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Finally, a fourth variation: the facts are the same as the third variation,
with the lawyer representing multiple clients and selectively using his own
address when it boosts the recovery for low-income clients. But what if the
lawyer knows that his particular low-income clients would rather litigate
than accept a lowball settlement offer? Although the deceitful conduct in the
fourth variation is identical to the deceitful conduct in the third variation, the
outcome is quite different: arguably, the lawyer's deceit creates a win-win
outcome. Given the settlement intentions of these particular clients, the
manufacturer's crudely designed system would actually undermine its effort
to minimize both the total payout and the litigation costs. But due to the
lawyer's intentional deception, the low-income client receives a fair
payment for his injury and the manufacturer achieves its ultimate goal of
avoiding litigation. Perhaps the lawyer has done the manufacturer a favor by
engaging in deceptive conduct.
This hypothetical shows that the exact same conduct can result in a
variety of ethical outcomes depending on the lawyer's intent. In contrast, a
view that Rule 4.1 imposes universal duties of truthfulness would fail to
capture any of this nuance. As a result, Rule 4.1 may lead to suboptimal
outcomes not only for low-income litigants but for both parties.
B. Incorporatingan Outcome-basedStandard into Rule 4.1
As the murderer example in Part A shows, a universal application of the
truthfulness rule will sometimes lead to consequences that are morally
wrong. Drawing the line between a moral and immoral outcome is
undoubtedly difficult. However, to the extent the legal profession
conceptualizes truthfulness as a universal good, 88 there needs to be some
consideration of outcomes in order to avoid morally wrong results.
To be sure, drawing that line is not easy. However, the fact that it is not
easy does not excuse the profession from at least attempting it. In fact, an
outcome-based standard for truthfulness in negotiations has been proposed

negotiation if it is for "morally benign reasons"); Geoffrey C. Hazard, The Lawyer's
Obligation to be Trustworthy When Dealing with Opposing Parties, in WHAT'S FAIR, supra
note 1, at 170-73 (arguing against a rule of disclosure that would require lawyers to disclose
facts to opposing parties of which they were obviously ignorant and which might "affect the
integrity of the transaction" because lawyers' trustworthiness cannot be regulated).
188. See Bok, supra note 178, at 87 ("[T]rust in some degree of veracity functions as a
foundation of relations among human beings; when this trust shatters or wears away,
institutions collapse.").
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in the past.1 89 Specifically, in the drafting of the Model Rules, an early
formulation of Rule 4.1 was coupled with a rule requiring lawyers to be
"fair" in negotiations.1 90 The language in the current version of Rule 4.1 was
initially contained in a broader proposed rule entitled "Fairness to Other
Participants," proposed as Rule 4.2.191 Similar to today's Rule 4.1, the
proposed Rule 4.2(b) contained a prohibition against knowing
misrepresentation of fact, as well as a disclosure requirement in which
disclosure is necessary to correct "a manifest misapprehension of fact or law
93
resulting from a previous representation"1 92 by the lawyer or the client.1
But proposed Rule 4.2(a) contained a specific directive for negotiators: "In
conducting negotiations a lawyer shall be fair in dealing with other
participants." 9 4
This language regarding "fairness" in negotiations provoked a firestorm
of criticism.1 95 Geoffrey Hazard explains that the vehement aversion to the
proposed rule was likely a result of several factors, including the lack of
clear norms regarding fairness in negotiations, as well as the differences in
technique among different types of lawyers.196 There was much concern that
due to wide variations in negotiating styles relating to region and the nature
of the dispute, it would be impossible to define or enforce any rule requiring
"fairness." 97 Without clear definitions, Rule 4.1 risked becoming "a vehicle
for lawyers with one set of values to characterize other, honest lawyers with
different values as 'unfair' and in violation of the rule."1 98 The language
requiring fairness in negotiations was ultimately removed,1 99 and the

189. See ABA Comm. on Evaluation of Prof 1 Standards, Discussion Draft (1980)
(proposing that a statement be "false, fraudulent, or misleading if it is likely to create an
unjustified expectation").
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See Hazard, supra note 187, at 170 (noting many fundamental objections were made
toward the proposal that lawyers be "fair").
196. Id. at 171-72. See also GIFFORD, supra note 29, at 114 (explaining that
geographical reasons and the norms of a practice area will influence each lawyer's degree of
truthfulness); Steele, supra note 27, at 1400-01 (explaining that fairness is too "nebulous" a
concept for sanctions-based rules).
197. Hazard, supra note 187, at 171.
198. Steele, supra note 27, at 1400-01.
199. See id. at 1402 (explaining that the drafters of Rule 4.1 voted for a different version
of the rule that ignored fairness).
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proposed truthfulness obligations in Rule 4.2(b) became a standalone rule in
the final version of the Model Rules.200
But imagine if this controversial language had not been deleted. We
would be left with a specific rule requiring fairness in negotiations, followed
by a more general rule regarding truthfulness in all dealings with others.
The proposed fairness obligation in Rule 4.2(a) would undoubtedly have
colored our understanding of how to comply with the truthfulness obligation
in Rule 4.2(b) during negotiations. This is a stark contrast to the current
version of the rules, in which the truthfulness obligation in Rule 4.1 stands
as a categorical imperative. Only upon further reading of Comment 2 does
one see that this categorical imperative is not intended to impede "generally
accepted conventions in negotiation,"201 such as bluffing about valuations.
And there is no longer any mention of fairness. As Section II.C explains,
there are good reasons to revisit this language in order to prevent harmful
outcomes for low-income litigants.
In addition, Comment 2 to Rule 4.1 could be revised to make clear that
false responses to direct questions about settlement authority are
permissible. For many practitioners, this will not be viewed as a rule change
at all; instead, it will merely support their present understanding of the
202
rule.
More importantly, with all parties on the same page about
permissible tactics, truthful statements about settlement authority will no
longer be a virtue exercised by the most ethical lawyers to the detriment of
their clients-and low-income clients in particular.
C. A TheoreticalFramework
The proposal in Part B finds some support in the existing literature. For
example, Alan Strudler has endorsed a limited exception to the general rule
that negotiators should not deceive that applies specifically to settlement
203
positions.20 Strudler argues that deceptions are immoral when they
undermine trust, cause economic harm, or violate the Kantian prescription

200. See id. at 1402 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4.1 (AM. BAR Ass'N
2016)) (noting the adopted Rule 4.1 focused merely on a lawyer not knowingly making false
statements of material fact or failing to disclose a material fact).
201. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4.1. cmt. 2.

202. See supra Section IIC; see also Hogan, supra note 20, at 733-34 (explaining that
three studies of professionals and law students between 1988 and 2012 all showed great
conflict over the question of whether it was ethical to lie about a client's authorization to
settle).
203. Strudler, supra note 182, at 138. Strudler's discussion uses the term "reservation
price," which is the negotiator's bottom line, or the amount at which the negotiator would
rather walk away from the deal. Id.
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204

against using people as means to an end. But he believes that lying about
one's settlement position does none of these things, and in fact helps
205
facilitate a mutually beneficial solution.
Strudler concludes that lying about one's settlement position is fair, as
long as both parties understand that it is a common negotiation convention to
lie.206 If the parties have equal assumptions about the possibility of
deception inherent in a party's stated reservation price, they will continue
bargaining in an attempt to ascertain the other side's true settlement
preferences. 207 Strudler notes that his perspective is consistent with others
who have described the art of bargaining as "the art of sending misleading
208
messages" about settlement positions.
In a direct criticism of Strudler's position, Peter Cramton and J. Gregory
Dees challenge his assertion that lies about settlement preferences are not
209
immoral.
In particular, they argue that Strudler overestimates the
210
likelihood of a mutually beneficial solution.
Indeed, when one party has
been deceived about operative facts, what may appear to be a "good" result
is in fact not objectively good.211 Likewise, Cramton and Dees argue that the
proposal underestimates the cost of deception, particularly if parties who are
truthfully asserting a reservation price must then send a more costly signal to
212
convince the other side that they are sincere.
For example, a union may
have to engage in a costly strike if the employer does not trust that its
demand for a particular wage is in fact the union's bottom line.2 13 In both
214
instances, the sense of trust in negotiations is undermined.
Importantly, neither of the concerns raised by Cramton and Dees apply
in a situation involving a low-income plaintiff. As discussed above in
Section II.B, the client's need for fast cash to pay living expenses makes it
more likely that the client is willing to accept an offer that is below what
both parties would otherwise consider a fair settlement price. Moreover,
because a low-income plaintiff does in fact need to accept a quick

204. Id. at 146.
205. Id. at 146-49.
206. Id. at 152-53. See also LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 74, at 148 (quoting the British
statesman Henry Taylor: "[F]alsehood ceases to be falsehood when it is understood on all sides
that the truth is not expected to be spoken.").
207. Strudler, supra note 182, at 152-53.
208. Id. at 139 n.3 (citing ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON 165 (1988)).
209. Cramton & Dees, supra note 44, at 158-61.
210. Id. at 159.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 159-60.
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settlement, the risk that other plaintiffs will have to engage in costly
signaling is diminished. Indeed, just ceasing negotiations for a month or two
may be all the signal that a defendant needs to realize that a plaintiff is
willing to stand firm in her refusal to accept a lowball offer.
Strudler's position finds some unlikely support from the field of
business law, where securities professor Donald Langevort has written
extensively about what types of fraud should be deterred by legal
institutions.2 15 Langevort's theory starts with the premise that the question of
what constitutes fraud is by definition contextual and fact-specific.2 16 He
contends that instead of attempting to reach an ex ante definition of when a
statement crosses the line into actionable fraud, the law should be more
217
concerned with the purpose of preventing the wrongs that fraud produces.
In his view, the reason why we have a law of fraud in the first place is to
promote efficiency: it is sometimes more efficient for a party to rely on an
adversary's statement than to conduct one's own investigation. 218 According
to Langevort, the more important the information and the more costly it is
for the reliant party to obtain the information on its own, the more important
219
it is to compel accurate disclosure.
There are three aspects of Langevort's view that conflict with lawyers'
professional ethics. The first conflict arises from the corollary that if it is
relatively low cost for a party to obtain the information necessary to evaluate
the adversary's statement, then it follows that the party should be expected
to do so. In other words, the law of fraud should not punish the easily
verifiable statement because it would be foolish to rely on your adversary's
representation if you can simply obtain the information on your own.
However, neither the ABA nor the legal profession in general would likely
look favorably on a rule that says you can lie if a competent adversary could
easily detect your lie.220 Casual deceit is not a good look for the profession.
The second conflict comes from the fact that certain statements that may
have a high verification cost are permitted by Rule 4.1. For example,
Comment 2 explicitly authorizes a lawyer to engage in puffery about things

215. Donald Langevort, Half Truths: ProtectingMistaken Inferences by Investors and
Others, in WHAT'S FAIR, supra note 1, at 398-99.
216. See id. at 399 (explaining that fraud is about human discourse and human discourse
is essentially contextual and fact-specific).
217. See id. at 401 (explaining that while some guidelines may be useful to determine
fraud, discourse is contextual in nature and language is inherently imprecise).
218. Id. at 401-02.
219. Id.
220. See GIFFORD, supra note 29, at 100 (noting that negotiation can and should be used
as a cheaper alternative to discovery, particularly in low dollar disputes).
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like valuation, even though verification may require costly investments.
For example, in order to verify an intentionally inflated valuation of
property, it may be necessary to hire an assessor, which could cost several
hundred dollars. In personal injury cases, it is even more costly to verify an
opponent's claims about injuries or future medical costs. Typically, a record
review by a medical expert costs a few thousand dollars.222 The costs are
223
even higher if litigation is likely. Moreover, having invested the resources
into coming up with a competing valuation, litigation may in fact become
more likely. Thus, arguably, the current version of Rule 4.1 does little to
protect against inefficient fraud.
But the third conflict dovetails nicely with Strudler's theory: what
happens when information is in the exclusive control of the party disclosing
it? For this category of information, the law of fraud has no efficiency
component;224 requiring honesty is not going to increase or decrease the
225
costs to the parties.
Therefore, arguably, a party to a negotiation should
226
never trust unverifiable information from its opponent.
And because there
is a natural element of distrust in this type of assertion, there is no need to
use Rule 4.1 to cover this conduct.227
The ABA has already endorsed this approach in the context of caucused
mediation, where the mediator meets individually with each party to obtain
private information that can be used cautiously to bridge gaps.228 In a formal
opinion, the ABA explained that "puffing" refers to a statement that a party
would not justifiably rely upon in a negotiation setting.229 Because Comment
2 carves out puffery from the duties imposed by Rule 4.1, a fair corollary
would be to clarify that Rule 4.1 only applies to statements upon which your

221. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4.1 cmt. 2 (noting that certain types of
statements, like estimates of price or value, ordinarily are not taken as statements of material
fact).
222. See generally Stephen D. Easton, Damages: Expert Witnesses, 1 J. DIsP. RESOL. 37,
48 (2004) (stating that expert witnesses often charge a substantially higher rate than the
attorneys in the case).
223. See generally id. (stating that it is common for expert witness fees to be the largest
component of litigation expenses).
224. Langevort, supra note 215, at 403.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 74, at 148-49 (arguing that an appropriate ethical
system should work no matter which side of the encounter the lawyer is on).
228. See ABA Comm'n. on Ethics & Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-439 (2006)
(explaining that mediation is a consensual process with a neutral third party and in caucused
mediation the mediator meets privately with each party individually to assist in resolving
disputes).
229. Id. at 2.
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adversary or negotiating partner is justified in relying. A clear statement that
Rule 4.1 does not apply to settlement authority would help ensure that
negotiators should not rely on a party's representations, thereby creating a
level playing field for this aspect of negotiations.
D.

Critiques of an Outcome-Based Model Don't Apply to Situations
Involving Low-Income Litigants

One of the main critiques of relaxing truthfulness obligations in
negotiations is that a rule change will encourage unethical behavior.230
Indeed, with so many scholars advocating for stricter rules, a proposal to
relax the rules may seem unreasonable on its face.231 But this Article argues
that relaxing the disclosure obligations in negotiation situations will not
increase unethical behavior.232

At the outset, the existing Rule 4.1 is not a model of clarity. What
appears to be a clear prohibition in the text of the rule itself is then scaled
back by comments that obscure the clear line drawn by the text.233 Although
this approach is likely intentional, it is not at all satisfying to those who
234
Moreover, even for those who favor
argue for clear and enforceable rules.
uncertainty, the indeterminacy of the rule does not seem to have a broad
235
salutary effect, at least in negotiations.
Thus, the current formulation of
the rule is not satisfying to anyone. There are three arguments for why
replacing it with a purely aspirational rule is likely to improve outcomes.
First, it is not entirely clear that a sanctions-based regime is an effective
236
way to police unethical conduct in negotiation in the first place.
If a

230. See Art Hinshaw & Jess Alberts, Doing the Right Thing: An Empirical Study of
Negotiation Ethics, 16 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 95, 108-09 (2011) (noting that the current
truthfulness standards adopted in Rule 4.1 promote a significant amount of deception in
negotiation).
231. Id.
232. Interestingly, business ethicists don't appear to place a high value on lawyers' duties
of truthfulness. Compare Cramton & Dees, supra note 44, at 115-26 (explaining the
importance of verification and reputation for truthfulness in business negotiations), with id. at
131 (explaining that lawyers are known for "their strong norms to faithfully represent their
clients' interests").
233. See Russell, supra note 4, at 150-51 (outlining the comments to Rule 4.1 and how
the comments interact with Rule 4.1).
234. Id. at 150 ("For those who prefer a clear-cut rule, the impact of the comments may
seem an annoyance, muddying the water of a crystalline rule and burdening lawyers with
uncertainty.").
235. See discussionsupra Section II.B.
236. See generally Russell, supra note 4, at 137, 149 (noting the widespread critique of
both statutory and common law based sources of ethics); see also Cramton & Dees, supra note
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lawyer makes a false representation about a client's authorization to settle,
237
this results in a violation of Rule 4.1. But how likely is it that this sort of
rule violation will ever come to light, much less result in disciplinary
proceedings? 238 In the vast majority of situations, it is only the aspirational
desire to be an ethical lawyer that will influence a lawyer's behavior, and not
the possibility of rule-based sanctions.239 When circumstances make a
240
deception hard to detect, the likelihood of deception is heightened.
In
addition, the low level of detection will result in limited enforcement, which
in turn will lead to arbitrary results that undermine buy-in.241 The tension is
heightened by the knowledge that an unethical lawyer can easily skirt this
rule, leaving only the ethical lawyer to suffer the consequences in terms of
feeling conflicted and stymied.242
For example, consider a scenario in which two parties have been
negotiating over a personal injury settlement. The defense lawyer is
authorized to settle for up to $750,000 and has made an offer of $650,000.
Instead of negotiating for a higher amount, the plaintiff's lawyer simply asks
whether the defense attorney is authorized to settle for $750,000. Many
ethicists who have written about truthfulness in negotiations would agree
that the defense lawyer cannot simply say "No." 243 But in reality, the

44, at 130 (noting that the law is "unfortunately . .
enforcement of norms").

rather a blunt instrument for the

237. ABA Comm'n. on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-370 (1993). But
see Hogan, supra note 20, at 733-34 (noting that studies show great professional conflict over
the question of whether it is ethical to lie about a client's authorization to settle).
238. See Hogan, supra note 20, at 733 (noting "the tension between 4.1(a) and the lack of
realistic consequences"); see also White, supra note 15, at 91 (explaining that negotiations are
generally non-public behavior where there is rarely an opportunity to detect false statements).
Perhaps due to the fact that communications with clients are generally kept confidential, most
cases that have culminated in discipline or other negative consequences for Rule 4.1 violations
in negotiations involve untrue statements about matters that can be disputed by evidence from
third parties, such as the extent of a party's insurance coverage or the death of a client. See,
e.g., Hogan, supra note 20, at 729-30 (collecting cases).
239. See White, supra note 15, at 91-92 (explaining that because negotiation is
nonpublic behavior, ethical norms can probably be violated with greater confidence that the
lawyer will not be discovered and sanctioned).
240. See Cramton & Dees, supra note 44, at 124-26 (noting that the accuracy of a
statement about reservation value is hard to verify, and therefore likely to be a source of
deception).
241. See Schwartz, supra note 160, at 334 (noting that imposing discipline in the few
cases where deception surfaces would create an arbitrary system of enforcement).
242. See White, supra note 15, at 91-92 (arguing that generally unenforceable rules like
Rule 4.1 put ethical lawyers at a disadvantage).
243. See, e.g., Hodes, supra note 58, at 542 ("[L]ying in response to a direct question
regarding settlement authority is unacceptable, and everyone within [Professional Reform
Initiative] agrees.").
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profession is sharply divided on this question: two studies that combine
responses from professors, litigators and judges show that between a quarter
and half of respondents think that it is ethical to misrepresent the facts of
244
client authorization.
So what is a truly ethical lawyer to do in that situation? Revealing the
information hurts the client's negotiating position, because it reframes the
discussion from a number that the negotiators agree is reasonable to what the
defense client agreed was an acceptable worst-case scenario in private
discussions with his or her attorney. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the
plaintiffs lawyer will share the same ethical compunction to reveal the
plaintiff's bottom line on settlement; to the contrary, simply by asking the
question, the plaintiffs lawyer is indicating that she is jockeying for an
advantage.
Several respondents thought that dodging the question was the most
245
palatable option. But this does not necessarily solve the problem; evasion
is not especially effective when the fact that a lawyer is clearly evading
246
certain yes/no questions can be as telling as an accurate answer would be.
But setting aside the fact that evasion may not solve the practical problem
for the attorney facing this sort of question, evasion will likely chill
discussions, thereby undermining the possibility of rapport that could
247
otherwise lead to an effective negotiation.
248
Second, in light of the respect-based dynamic in negotiation,
aspirational ethics may be as effective or even more effective than sanctionsbased codes of conduct. Indeed, with the exception of Comment 2 to Model
Rule 4.1, the rules have few direct prescriptions about what lawyers must or
must not do during negotiations.249 And this is likely intentional: one of the
drafters of the Model Rules has explained that the Rules should not be called

244. See Hogan, supra note 20, at 731-32 (describing studies by Larry Lempert and
Peter Reilly).
245. Id. at 734 (quoting Larry Lempert, In Settlement Tales, Does Telling the Truth Have
Its Limits?, 2 INSIDE LITIG. 16 (1988)); see also Korobkin, supra note 7, at 1807 (explaining
that a negotiator can simply refuse to answer particular questions designed to elicit private
information that will affect a party's reservation point).
246. See supra Section II.D and notes 69-72.
247. See supra Section II.B.
248. See Cohen, supra note 2, at 743 ("[T]he act of negotiation does not relieve one of
the moral duty to respect others.").
249. See, e.g., Steele, supra note 27, at 1388 ("[N]o well-understood, commonly
accepted unifying philosophy for negotiating exists."); see also Hogan, supra note 20, at 726
(explaining that, under the Model Rules, "the line between what is legal and what is not can
sometimes be hard to find").
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"a code of ethics" but rather "legislation defining [the] role and rules of role
in the practice of law."250
To be sure, many scholars have criticized the Model Rules for not going
far enough to prevent unethical negotiations, and perhaps even promoting
dishonesty by explicitly authorizing tactics like puffery.251 But others have
defended the efficacy of the current rules,252 while a few have even
suggested that disciplinary rules are not the most effective way to promote
253
good behavior.
For example, Jonathan Cohen has made a strong case
against using professional rules to regulate the values that underlie effective
negotiations, specifically, "the inner respect of the heart and mind" that a
254
lawyer should have for his or her adversary.
The Rules' focus on
255
"punishing egregious behavior"
does little to "promote maximalist
goals,"256 and the threat of sanctions is unlikely to produce the degree of
257
respect for one's adversary that facilitates effective resolutions.
Courts have expressed similar frustration with the notion that the details
of ethical behavior need to be clearly spelled out for lawyers.258 For
example, in a case involving a lawyer's failure to disclose that her client had
died during litigation, the Kentucky Supreme Court noted that this should
have been "a matter of common ethics and plain common sense." 25 9 Instead,

250. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Legal andEthical Position of the Code of Professional
Ethics, 5 Soc. RESP: JOURNALISM L. MED. 5, 7 (1979).
251. See, e.g, Rubin, supra note 8, at 591 (arguing that lawyers should be held to a higher
standard of truthfulness in negotiation); see also Rubin, supra note 161, at 456 (citing Scott S.
Dahl, Ethics on the Table: Stretching the Truth in Negotiations, 7 REV. LITIG. 173 (1988);
Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1219 (1990))
(arguing that because authors have felt the need to "develop and articulate [ethics] criteria for
negotiations," this "indicates that the . . . Model Rules are seriously deficient in this regard");
Steele, supra note 27, at 1403 (arguing for a duty of "total candor and total cooperation" in
negotiation).
252. See generally Russell, supra note 4, at 137, 138 ("[T]he Model Rules emphasize
certainty . . . [and] lessen the costs to lawyers of imposition of sanctions in situations of
uncertainty.").
253. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 55, at 782 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT Scope ¶¶ 14, 15 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2004)) (arguing that the Model Rules should be
viewed as "rules of reason" that should be interpreted broadly based on the specific factual
context of the lawyer's role).
254. Cohen, supra note 2, at 794.
255. Id. at 757.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 794.
258. See, e.g., Ky. Bar Ass'n v. Geisler, 938 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Ky. 1997) (rejecting the
notion that attorneys need guidelines to understand ethical obligations).
259. Id.
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'

the Court adopted an ABA ethics opinion outlining this duty,260 explaining
with some exasperation that this step was necessary "because attorneys such
as respondent cannot discern such matters and require written guidelines so
as to figure out their ethical convictions." 26
The prospect of less detail also appeals to those commentators who are
262
skeptical of the ABA's attempt to micromanage various styles of practice.
For instance, James White has criticized the "gratuitous direction" of the
263
ABA's commentary on how to conduct ethical negotiations.
He argues
that most of the ABA's ethical guidance interferes with substantive choices
264
among legitimate negotiation techniques.
Relying on aspirational rather than sanction-based professional
standards has three benefits.265 First, it avoids creating an external source of
the "negotiator's dilemma," 266 which can chill communication and diminish
267
the prospects of building rapport.
Second, to the extent that ethics rules
can sometimes be a trap for the unwary, they avoid creating a source of
268
obligation that can be exploited by a less ethical adversary.
Third, replacing narrow rules with broad aspirations shifts the emphasis
from the question of "what can I get away with" to "what is the best way to
behave in this situation?" To facilitate the latter inquiry, Jonathan Cohen
proposes increasing reputation-based economic incentives, together with
better education of law students, lawyers, and clients about what makes an

260. ABA Comm'n on Ethics & Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 397 (1995)
(discussing an attorney's duty to disclose the death of a client during settlement negotiations of
a pending lawsuit to opposing counsel).
261. Geisler, 938 S.W.2d at 580.
262. See, e.g., White, supra note 15, at 93 ("[D]iscussion of style and substance of
negotiation as opposed to the ethical behavior in negotiation seems gratuitous and
inappropriate in the Model Rules and in the Comments to the Model Rules.").
263. Id.
264. Id. at 92. For example, White believes that the ABA has unfairly branded
curmudgeonly lawyers as less ethical than those who negotiate with a smile on their face,
while lawyers who argue over every last detail are deemed less ethical than those who are
content to argue over the main aspects of the agreement and then shake hands on a
commitment to getting the deal done. Id.
265. See generally Cohen, supra note 2, at 741-42 n.3 (citing sources) (discussing the
debate on whether there should be a greater duty of candor in negotiation placed on lawyers
rather than the "minimalistic duties that currently exist").
266. Id. at 768.
267. See supra Section II.B.
268. See generally Jamison Davies, Formalizing Legal Reputation Markets, 16 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 367, 374 (2011) (arguing that cooperative reputations between negotiating
lawyers create and enforce trust, which leads to "agreeable long-term deals in which neither
side feels exploited").
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269

effective negotiator.
Similarly, Jamison Davies has argued for increased
270
transparency in the market of lawyer reputation.
The prospect of having access to lawyers' negotiation tactics and
271
In addition,
patterns could be a very effective check on attorney behavior.
access to information about who is engaging in honest negotiation could also
help avoid the "spillover" problem, when lawyers assume that because
everybody else seems to be engaging in dishonest tactics, they need to as
well.272 Even advocates for a stronger sanctions-based regime agree that
making ethical actions more visible might be a more effective approach to
solving the social dilemma that arises when we can't count on our
273
counterparts in negotiations to be ethical.
For example, it's hardly a stretch to imagine a defense attorney
beginning every negotiation by explaining that the client believes that this is
a nuisance suit and it will not settle for more than the cost of litigation. If the
lawyer couples this posturing with an assertion that the client's top dollar is
$10,000, this statement arguably violates Rule 4.1 if the client has privately
authorized a more reasonable payment. But how would that violation ever
come to light? Instead, the better deterrent would be the reputational hit to
the attorney if it were clear that she takes the same position at the outset of
every case.
Changing the reputational consequences for and among lawyers may not
be sufficient to deter unethical conduct, particularly if there are client
expectations that a lawyer will achieve the best result using any means
necessary. Arguably, this could lead to the defection problem identified by
Howard Raiffa.274 Thus, some scholars have proposed reeducation of clients

269. See Cohen, supra note 2, at 796-801 (discussing reputation-based economic
incentives and education as "possible avenues for promoting better orientation ethics" in
addition to ethics codes).
270. Davies, supra note 268, at 377, 378.
271. See Hogan, supra note 20, at 736 ("Practitioners . . understand . . the strong
advantages a good reputation can have in negotiation.").
272. See generally LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 74, at 152-53 (describing the long-term
externality of dishonest tactics, which is that the spillover effect makes unethical behavior
"irresistible").
273. See, e.g., Raiffa et al., supra note 118, at 17 (explaining the "n-person social trap"
that arises when negotiators weigh the short-term benefit of acting selfishly against the longterm benefit of acting nobly); id. ("[I]f the rules of the game were changed to make 'goodness'
more visible, then more [negotiators] would opt for the noble action.").
274. See id. at 18. But see THOMPSON, supra note 40, at 131 (explaining the "halo
effect," in which we presume that people with one socially desirable characteristic also possess
other attractive traits). Therefore, one may presume that lawyers with good reputations are also
intelligent and capable. A strong halo effect could make it less likely that lawyers would risk
their reputation by defecting in specific instances where it is advantageous to do so.
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275

One option
as a key step in realizing the benefits of aspirational ethics.
proposed by Roger Fisher is to provide a memorandum to new clients
explaining the benefits of negotiating ethically, along with the risks that
arise with unethical behavior.276 However, this approach potentially gives

the client too much of a say in the lawyer's choice to follow aspirational
ethics: not only does this approach indicate that the client has authority to
request that the lawyer defect from the noble course of action, 277 but it even
suggests that the client must approve the lawyer's choice to take an ethical
approach. 278 Thus, this approach is ultimately an endorsement of situational
ethics, which too easily leads to defection problems.
Fisher's approach is a very client-centric reading of the current Model
Rules, particularly Model Rule 1.2.279 While a take-it-or-leave-it approach to
negotiation ethics would arguably also be appropriate, Fisher's focus on
client approval for acting nobly ensures the maximum flexibility in
280
achieving a good outcome for the client, thereby emphasizing the lawyer's
duties under Model Rules 1.1 and 1.4. However, the question of how to
balance the desire to act nobly with the duty to serve the client's interests
would be much clearer if the Model Rules contained an aspirational
obligation to act nobly.28' Including this aspirational duty alongside the other
Model Rules would make clear that a client has no authority to "opt out" of a
lawyer's decision to act nobly in negotiations.
Another possibility noted by Cramton and Dees is to create industry
associations that certify an attorney's credibility and reputation in
282
negotiations.
In the business context, small contractors rely on large

275. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 86, at 23-26 (asserting that ethical problems may be
limited "by conducting a preliminary negotiation between lawyer and client, clarifying the
basis on which the lawyer is conducting the negotiation" and proposing a memo to facilitate
this discussion).
276. Id. at 24-29.
277. See generally Steele, supra note 27, at 1390-91 (criticizing the notion that "clients
have a right to a lawyer who engages in deception").
278. See Fisher, supra note 86, at 25 (encouraging the client to read the Code of
Negotiation Ethics "and approve my trying to adhere to it").
279. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2015) (stating that
the client determines the objectives of the representation and consults with the lawyer about
the means used to accomplish those objectives).
280. Fisher, supra note 86, at 24 (stating that a lawyer has a professional duty to act
zealously to advance the client's interests).
281. See Steele, supra note 27, at 1390 (arguing that the Model Rules should do more to
clarify whether a client is entitled to a lawyer who acts deceptively).
282. See, e.g., Cramton & Dees, supra note 44, at 132 (explaining that using a brand or
certifier for credentialing purposes is an effective way to promote ethical negotiations).
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For instance, third party organizations
brands to establish trustworthiness.
like Consumer Reports and J.D. Powers and Associates provide independent
284
These sources of
information to help evaluate products and services.
reputational information work alongside enforcement tools like state lemon
laws or agencies like the Federal Trade Commission to help deter deceptive
-285
practices.
Importing these concepts to the legal profession, a lawyer's trade group
could develop a voluntary code of ethical conduct that individual lawyers
could choose to sign on to. A lawyer's membership in this group would send
a strong signal as to his or her commitment to certain norms of negotiating.
In conjunction with client education that promotes these norms as efficient
and leading to optimal outcomes, such lawyers could find themselves in
higher demand at the bargaining table. Moreover, the organization's rules
could make clear that lawyers who sign on to the trade group's code of
conduct but then disregard it may be referred for discipline under their
286
state's rules against dishonesty or deception.
Here, the deception would
not derive from the negotiation conduct itself, but rather from the fact that
the lawyer held herself out as an adherent to a voluntary code of ethics that
she did not fully uphold. In this fashion, state disciplinary authorities could
work in conjunction with private trade associations to improve the overall
ethics of the profession.
In sum, there are several ways to encourage greater commitment to
ethical standards in negotiation that do not depend upon an indeterminate
rule coupled with an implausible threat of enforcement. Arguably, a system
that depends on transparency and the buy-in of lawyers and clients may be
more effective in creating a level playing field than a system that can easily
be exploited by an unethical lawyer or a party seeking short-term gain.
V.

CONCLUSION

In the negotiation context, Model Rule 4.1 is neither clear in its scope
nor effective in producing ethical results. A strict enforcement of the
truthfulness obligation in negotiation context risks chilling settlement
discussions, hurting all parties. But the burdens from the current articulation

283. Id.
284. Id. at 131-32.
285. Id. at 129-30 (noting that the efficacy of these formal mechanisms are debatable).
286. Most states have some version of Model Rule 8.4(c), which prohibits lawyers from
engaging in any conduct that involves dishonesty, deception, or misrepresentation. See, e.g.,
S.C. APP. CT. R. r. 407 RPC 8.4(d) (stating that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to
"engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation").
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of Rule 4.1 fall particularly hard on low-income litigants. To the extent that
our professional responsibility regime is concerned with the outcomes for
disadvantaged clients, this rule should be revisited.
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